NOTICE OF APPEAL - BRINK v WAGLAY JP
12 March 2025
To:
The Honourable Deputy Chief Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga,
Delegated Chairperson of the Judicial Service Commission’s
Judicial Conduct Committee[1]
IN THE MATTER OF:
ADV ANTHONY BRINK v JUDGE PRESIDENT
BASHEER WAGLAY
JUDICIAL CORRUPTION COMPLAINT: JSC 533/17[2]
NOTICE OF APPEAL
INTRODUCTION, ESTABLISHING THAT THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED
TIME
Icala
aliboli
– Zulu proverb
1.
None of the following is
intended to throw any shade on Judicial Service Commission (‘JSC’) Chairperson
Mandisa Maya CJ or Judicial Conduct Committee (‘JCC’) Chairperson Mbuyiseli
Madlanga DCJ, because the events recounted below as regards these bodies’
appalling conduct in the disposal of this ancient complaint occurred long before
they assumed their said offices.
2.
In mid-2017 I lodged a
squarely documented complaint of judicial corruption against Basheer Waglay JP
(now retired; ‘the Respondent’).[3]
3.
Then-JSC Secretary Lynette
Bios duly acknowledged it a few weeks later.[4]
4.
An entire year passed before
the Respondent responded to my complaint in June 2018 – fantastically
dishonestly and pathetically evasively, as I demonstrated beyond intelligent
contention in my extensive comments invited by the JCC and delivered by me later
in the month.[5]
5.
I then sweated blood as the
years rolled by, trying to get the JCC to decide my complaint. This included
providing duplicate copies at its request on no less than three occasions,[6]
and writing four successive letters to then‑JSC chair Mogoeng Mogoeng CJ[7]
and to then-JCC chair Raymond Zondo DCJ,[8]
plus one to Secretary Bios’s successor Sello Chiloane, in which I implored that
my long‑outstanding complaint be decided.[9]
All my letters proved fruitless, inasmuch as I heard nothing back from the JCC
about this.
6.
In mounting desperation, and
having by now concluded that the JCC chaired by Zondo DJP (as he then was) was
as useless, as ineffective, and as corrupt as all those other failed or failing
public entities in the New South Africa hauled before his State Capture
Commission and indicted in his final report,[10]
and that the JCC was determined to quietly cover for the Respondent – just as
the JSC did later on for Dunstan Mlambo JP, openly and actively, after
Constitutional Court Justice Elizabeth Nkabinde and Supreme Court of Appeal
Justice Ephraim Makgoka on the JCC Appeal Committee found he had a case to
answer before a Judicial Conduct Tribunal on my criminal and other charges
against him[11]
– I turned to approaching the State Security Agency (‘SSA’) by way of a specimen
draft intelligence report (‘Report’) prepared and submitted to its Director
General for submission to the President after editing at will.[12]
7.
The Report outlined the
exceedingly serious nature of my complaint and described the real evidence
supporting it; recorded the JCC’s inaction on it despite all my efforts to get
it decided; and pointed up the immense harm all this threatened public
confidence in the integrity of our country’s judicial system if it blew up
locally and abroad especially
[13]
– an inevitability if the Respondent’s judicial colleagues on the JSC/JCC
weren’t prepared to hold him to account, and continued conducting themselves
like a mutually protective judicial defence union or criminal cartel practising
the omerta.
8.
Even after my submission of
that Report, the JCC remained silent about the decision of my complaint[14]
– perhaps because the newspapers quoted Zondo CJ (as he now was) very
prejudicially and improperly dismissing as unfounded drivel my documented
judicial corruption complaints (including those against Mlambo JP) still pending
before the JCC, and stating that the judiciary should be protected from
discreditable persons like me making such horribly false allegations.[15]
9.
Finally, placing my draining
hopes for resolution on the changed guard at the head of the JSC and the JCC,
which is to say the new blood there, I wrote to incumbent JSC Chairperson Maya
CJ on 31 January 2025, comprehensively recounting – over one hundred paragraphs,
referencing forty-five annexures – the whole miserable history of the matter,
and pleading for the decision of my complaint at last, now more than
seven-and-a-half years since I’d filed it.[16]
10.
My letter informed Maya CJ
that Patricia Goliath DJP was handling the case,[17]
which fact I’d established with great difficulty, to wit by having to sue the
JSC out of the High Court at Pietermaritzburg under the Promotion of Access to
Information Act (‘PAIA’) for an order compelling it to respond to my duly made
request for the record of the allocation of my complaint for decision, after
this particular record request (and all my others) had been ignored and thereby
tacitly refused under section 27 of that Act – unjustifiably, illegally,
unconstitutionally, and very reprehensibly and disgracefully for this official
judicial watchdog.[18]
The JSC substantially conceded my application in its answering affidavit – even
as it now actively suppressed certain incriminating records[19]
– and told me Judge Goliath was dealing with my complaint, but that no record
existed of its allocation to her[20]
– which is to say Zondo DCJ was running his JCC without proper record-keeping,
like a spaza shop.
11.
On 14 February 2025, a
fortnight after my letter, JSC Secretary Mbali Songca emailed me: ‘Please
find the attached ruling I found in relation to this matter.’[21]
12.
The decision she sent me is
undated, so I don’t know when it was made, but I surmise it was shortly after
February 2020 when the then-JSC Secretary asked for, and I supplied, yet another
copy of my complaint, for the third and last time.[22]
13.
Plainly the decision hadn’t
recently been delivered in response to my letter, because the language of
Secretary Songca’s email suggests to a certainty that she’d ‘found’
it during an examination of the case file after receiving my letter; that it had
been sitting there for ages; and that I’d been left in the dark about it.
14.
In her concluding
‘RECOMMENDATION’ announcing her decision to dismiss my complaint, Judge Goliath
stated she was doing so under section 15(2)(d) of the Judicial Service
Commission Act (‘JSC Act’).
15.
Judge Goliath got the section
wrong. Section 15 had no application to the case. Subsection 1 provides:
(a) If the Chairperson or the Head of Court
designated in terms of section 14(2) is of the view that the complaint falls
within the parameters of the grounds set out in subsection (2), he or she must
dismiss the complaint.
(b) If the Head of Court designated in terms
of section 14(2) is of the view that the complaint should not be dismissed under
paragraph (a), he or she must refer the complaint to the Chairperson to be dealt
with in terms of section 16 or 17.
16.
The ‘grounds
set out in subsection (2)’
to which Judge Goliath alluded in dismissing my complaint under ‘section
(2)(d)’, were that in her learned opinion my documented complaint was, per
that subsection, ‘frivolous or lacking in
substance’.
17.
But under section 15(1)(a), only the JCC chairperson, or the Head of Court to
which he or she has referred it, may dismiss such ‘Lesser
complaints’.[23] And Zondo DCJ (as he then was)
couldn’t have referred the complaint to Judge Goliath as Head of Court, first
because she wasn’t ever Head of the Labour- and Labour Appeal Courts[24] (the
Respondent was at the time), and secondly because she was anyway only a Deputy
Judge President, and furthermore of the Western Cape High Court Division, a
quite different court, so (a) my complaint couldn’t have been allocated to her
to dispose of under section 15, and (b) she therefore didn’t have the power to
dismiss it under that section.
18. Clearly section 17 – ‘Inquiry into
serious, non-impeachable complaints by Chairperson or member of Committee’ –
was the applicable provision under which Judge Goliath decided my complaint
after then-JCC Chairperson Zondo DCJ[25] very
wrongly referred it to her, a single judge, as a ‘non‑impeachable complaint’ for disposal under that section. Plainly
Zondo DJP hadn’t bothered reading it to determine its gravity, and consequently
whether it should be disposed of under section 16 or section 17, and hadn’t
appreciated that it was a manifestly impeachable complaint for disposal as such
under section 16, headed ‘Committee may
recommend appointment of Tribunal in respect of impeachable complaints’:
‘(1) If the Chairperson is satisfied that,
in the event of a valid complaint being established, it is likely to lead to a
finding by the Commission that the respondent suffers from an incapacity, is
grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct, as envisaged in section
14(4)(a), the Chairperson must— (a) refer the complaint to the Committee in
order to consider whether it should recommend to the Commission that the
complaint should be investigated and reported on by a Tribunal’.
19.
Section 17(1) provides: ‘If—
(a) the Chairperson is satisfied that, in the event of a valid complaint
being established, the appropriate remedial action will be limited to one or
more of the steps envisaged in subsection (8)’ – namely ‘Apologising
to the complainant’, ‘A reprimand’,
‘A written warning’ etc – then ‘(b)
… the Chairperson or a member of the Committee designated by the Chairperson
must inquire into the complaint in order to determine the merits of the
complaint.’ (Imagine reckoning a case of documented judicial corruption
warrants no greater sanction than an apology, or reprimand, or written warning
etc.)
20.
Section 17(6) prescribes: ‘The Chairperson or member concerned must in writing inform the
Committee, the complainant and the respondent of— (a) a dismissal’
.
[26]
21.
Judge Zondo was Deputy Chief
Justice between 1 June 2017[27]
and 1 April 2022, when he became Chief Justice[28]
– retiring on 31 August 2024.[29]
22.
Under section 1 of the JSC
Act, the ‘“chairperson” means the Chief
Justice’. That is, the JSC Chairperson is the Chief Justice
ex officio. Under section 8(1), the JSC Chairperson is also the
Chairperson of the JCC, but may delegate the Deputy Chief Justice to chair the
JCC under section 8(3). And he (and now she) always does.
23.
Between 1 June 2017 (or
shortly afterwards) and 1 April 2022, then-Deputy Chief Justice Zondo was the
delegated Chairperson of the JCC; received my complaint lodged a few weeks after
he took office; and referred it to Judge Goliath for decision only under section
17, and not as obviously merited under section 16,[30]
governing ‘impeachable complaints’.[31]
24.
In unlawful breach of their
prescribed obligation to inform me that my complaint had been dismissed and of
the reasons for this, then-JCC Chairperson Zondo DCJ or Judge Goliath failed to
do so, with the result that the first I heard of it was when I received
Secretary Songca’s email on 14 February 2025 covering Judge Goliath’s undated
decision that she’d apparently turned up during an examination of the case file.
25.
Section 17(5) affords me ‘one month after receiving notice of that decision, [to] appeal to the
Committee in writing against that decision, specifying the grounds for the
appeal’, and I’ve duly delivered this written appeal and the grounds on
which it’s based within a month of receiving the decision.
26.
All the above explains why
this appeal against Judge Goliath’s decision to dismiss my complaint, likely
delivered around February 2020 or so, after I lodged my complaint in mid-2017
over seven-and-half years ago, has only been filed now, five years later in
February 2025, but in good time under section 17(5) of the JSC Act.
GROUNDS OF
APPEAL
As the court
tries the case, so the case tries the court.
– Robert Jackson, Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1941-54
27.
I regret the inordinate
length of this appeal notice, but it’s necessitated by the plethora of
appallingly careless, absolutely false, and gravely prejudicial statements with
which Judge Goliath’s decision is riddled; by her misleading assertion of key
facts as common cause that I’d pointedly placed in issue; and by her core errors
in deciding the central question: Did the Respondent violate his judicial oath
in corruptly dismissing under improper written influence my petition for leave
to appeal submitted to him under Case No. DA21/14?
28.
In sum, I’ll show that Judge
Goliath’s stated reasoning in arriving at her decision is so grossly irrational,
so shockingly bad, so logic‑defying, and so grotesquely perverse that no
sensible and sober person applying his or her sound mind to my complaint would
have rejected it as she did on the ‘grounds set out in subsection (2)’ of section 15, namely that it was ‘frivolous or lacking in substance’.[32]
AD PARAGRAPH
1 OF THE DECISION
Judges ... are picked out from the most dextrous lawyers, who are grown old or lazy, and having been biased all their lives against truth or equity, are under such a fatal necessity of favouring fraud, perjury and oppression, that I have known several of them to refuse a large bribe from the side where justice lay, rather than injure the faculty by doing anything unbecoming their nature in office.
– Jonathan Swift, Anglo-Irish satirist, 1667-1745
29.
In her first paragraph, Judge
Goliath quite irrelevantly but very prejudicially sets the stage for the rest of
her dismal show by uncritically restating one of the several internally
contradictory, unsupported, and objectively contradicted, manifestly false
justifications concocted in the national office of Legal Aid South Africa
(‘LASA’) for not appointing me to the top professional post for which I’d
successfully tendered my services in November 2009, in a crude cover-up of just
another perfectly normal, everyday instance of goods and services tender
corruption in the New South Africa.
30.
Which self‑same lying ‘budgetary constraints’ justification Mlambo JP told the Justice
Minister and the Justice Portfolio Parliament of the National Assembly in his ‘confidential’
reports to them to successfully pervert their separate and independently
instituted enquiries into the high-level recruitment corruption at LASA that I’d
reported to them – as Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka observed very correctly in
their commendably conscientious, 42‑page review and assessment of the
documentary and other evidence I presented in my complaints against him
regarding his criminal and other impeachable mendacity to these highest
executive and oversight authorities, concluding with their recommendation that
this criminally corrupt, lying judge be called to appear before a Judicial
Conduct Tribunal to please explain all this under oath on pain of penalty for
perjury, which is being locked up in jail. Just as you get jailed for lying to a
Portfolio Committee of the National Assembly, and for lying in court – at least
under law, if not in practice in the New South Africa, especially if you’re a
‘New Generation Judge’.[33]
31.
Marked up for relevance, I
annex relevant excerpts of Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka’s brilliant ruling in
which they comprehensive dealt with and saw clean through this stupid ‘budgetary constraints’ lie, thoughtlessly restated by Judge Goliath
to make me look like an irrationally disgruntled loser in a misfired job
application.
32.
Of course, whether this ‘budgetary constraints’ excuse for not appointing me was God’s own
truth or a filthy abject lie told by then-LASA Board chairman Mlambo JP and at
various other times by his equally criminally mendacious national management
executives, initially in their correspondence with me and then under oath: to
the Justice Minister, to Parliament, to several superior and lower courts, and
to the JCC (but not to LASA’s Board, which was told totally different,
contradictory lies by then-National Operations Executive Brian Nair told, as
Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka smartly spotted) has nothing whatsoever to do with
the merits of my complaint against the Respondent, which is that he violated his
judicial oath in succumbing to improper influence recorded in and exerted by a
‘memorandum’, as it’s headed, slipped to him round the side, suborning him to
toss my petition for leave to appeal the dismissal of my labour claim against
LASA in the Durban Labour Court. Which, unfortunately for him but fortunately
for me, he left in the Labour Appeal Court file for me to stumble across a few
months later.[34]
33.
This is after Hamilton Cele J
had completely botched the case, down to misallocating the final burden of
persuasion,[35]
even though I tried repeatedly explaining this critical, pivotal, unusual
procedural aspect of the particular case to him no less than three times: in my
opening address, again in my written heads of argument, and yet again in in my
oral argument. Apparently, however, this novel concept of a reversed onus in the
trial of an unfair discrimination claim[36]
was too complicated to comprehend. (The penny did eventually drop, but too late,
because he effectively conceded this crucial point after I raised it yet again
in my application to appeal his judgment; only, he claimed it made no difference
because LASA had presented a tremendous defence.)[37]
34.
On top which, this trial
judge failed to notice the glaring problems with LASA’s defence case, which, as
said, he reckoned was excellent – namely that, as emerged at trial, it was
unsupported and contradicted by LASA’s own records, and contradicted by
completely different bogus justifications given to LASA’s Board for not
appointing me to LASA’s top specialist legal professional post in KwaZulu-Natal,
right after I’d been selected and recommended for it in glowing terms – as
sharply spotted by Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka on page after page of their
clear-headed decision against Mlambo JP.
35.
In short, Judge Goliath’s
opening statement was completely irrelevant to the merits of my complaint. But
to any new reader unfamiliar with the background, she made me look a distracted
fool with a bee in his bonnet who just couldn’t accept the genuine, valid,
honest, true reason given to me, to the Minister, and to Parliament (before all
the litigation began, in which this lying reason was repeated in pleadings and
affidavits) for why LASA’s hitherto energetic and persistent drive over the
three-year period November 2006 to November 2009 to find the right man for its
thrice advertised, twice‑interviewed for Senior Litigator post at
Pietermaritzburg came to a sudden grinding halt right after I got picked for it,
and not the other guy secretly earmarked for it in the standard corrupt goods
and services tender routine in the New South Africa, like I said. In other
words, Judge Goliath began writing her decision by straining to undermine my
credibility as the complainant in the case.
AD PARAGRAPH
2
36.
Her second paragraph works to
the same effect. You’d never know reading it that LASA’s ‘budgetary
constraints’ excuse for not concluding my appointment was a flat-out lie for
all the reasons Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka recognised and enumerated on page
after page of their outstanding decision in the Mlambo JP case.
37.
But Judge Goliath is
incapable of getting it, because she can’t or won’t entertain the possibility
that the Respondent is guilty as charged. Her mind is closed. (Which is why, as
I’ll show below, she didn’t conduct the proper enquiry section 17(3)(b)
empowered to do.) Her protective instinct towards her brother on the bench
reflexively kicks in against this annoyingly insistent complainant making the
most terrible, completely wild-sounding accusations. Even as he comes with
receipts.
AD PARA 3
38.
The inaccuracies in this
paragraph are insufficiently relevant to the issues in this appeal, and
straightening them out here would consume more ink than it’s worth.
AD PARA 4
39.
Quite irrelevantly to the
complaint, but again displaying and generating further bias against me as the
complainant, Judge Goliath implies I’m a professionally inept somebody who
doesn’t know what he’s doing, because I took the wrong legal road in litigating
my case against LASA: ‘Apparently the
court held that he should have taken LASA’s abortion of his appointment on
review.’
40.
Sure, the clueless labour
judge dropped into paragraph 74 of his chaotic judgment this arbitrary,
pointless remark, logically disconnected from the rest of it, but no doubt
sounding impressively erudite and learned to ignorant persons unfamiliar with
our labour legislation and labour litigation conducted under it: ‘It
was the choice of the applicant not to seek to review the decision of the
respondent in not appointing him.’[38]
41.
Judge Goliath’s
unmistakeable, unequivocal implication in repeating this nonsense was that in
bringing my claim under section 50 of the Employment Equity Act, I didn’t know
whether I was coming or going; that I took the wrong legal road in seeking my
appointment;[39]
and that in making my spurious complaint against the Respondent I was equally
misguided, and my complaint was as spurious as my labour claim. But not even my
opponent LASA suggested my perfectly correctly formulated action under the just
said statutory provision was procedurally misconceived. On the contrary, it duly
pleaded to it and off we went to trial.
42.
Judge Goliath asserts as a
hard fact that ‘Waglay JP, Davis JA and
Sutherland JA considered the matter and dismissed the petition for leave to
appeal’, and she does so even though, as my complaint made plain, Labour
Appeal Court judges Denis Davis and Roland Sutherland JJA’s participation in the
case was very much in issue – having regard to the fact that, as my thorough
investigation of the whole rotten matter turned up, and as I noted in my
complaint, these three judges were presiding in different courts in different
cities on the day my petition was allegedly considered and dismissed in Durban,
per the dismissal order issued by the registrar.
43.
In other words, contrary to
Judge Goliath’s misrepresentation of the position here, whether ‘Waglay JP, Davis JA and Sutherland JA considered the matter and
dismissed the petition for leave to appeal’ , or whether the Respondent
threw it out on his own, is hotly in
dispute.
44.
Instead of stating this
truthfully and frankly, Judge Goliath grudgingly hints at the existence of a
dispute about this extraordinarily serious matter by baldly stating, without
mention of the available supporting evidence I said I possessed proving it, ‘According
to him the panel of judges did not consider the petition’.
45.
Had Judge Goliath been
concerned to investigate the matter with an open mind, as section 17(3)(b)
required of her,[40]
in other words had she been motivated to conduct a proper enquiry, she’d have
asked Davis and Sutherland JJA whether they’d indeed participated in the
dismissal of my petition, as alleged in the dismissal order, and whether they
really thought it was completely meritless.
46.
It wasn’t the nub of my
charge that Davis and Sutherland JJA had no hand in the case,[41]
but had Judge Goliath enquired of them about this and had they confirmed that
they knew nothing of the matter, it would have been extremely cogent evidence
showing that my petition was indeed corruptly rejected by the Respondent,
prematurely and procedurally irregularly, without the participation of the other
two judges named in the dismissal order, and, on an overwhelming preponderance
of probabilities in all the circumstances, motivated by that criminal
‘memorandum’.
47.
Judge Goliath proceeds to
foul her vague hint of my evidenced claim that ‘the
panel of judges did not consider the petition’ (‘According
to him’) by stating a complete and total falsehood in the second half of her
sentence: ‘and he avers that the decision
was in fact made by a junior clerk.’ As the cold print of my complaint
shows, I never made any such averment at all, and Judge Goliath’s dishonest
claim that I did is absolutely and contemptibly false.
48.
Quite the contrary, where I
did mention ‘a junior law clerk’ in
paragraph 35 of my complaint, it was in my discussion of the probabilities
regarding the identity of the criminal who forged and uttered that anonymous,
unsigned ‘memorandum’ to defeat the ends of justice, lying at the centre of my
complaint, and I show that it couldn’t have been and wasn’t any ‘junior
law clerk’.
49.
But Judge Goliath’s
untruthful misrepresentation here reveals how she approached my extremely
serious complaint with incredulity, with unshakeable bias, her mind made up
before she started, portraying me as some silly person making ridiculous claims
(to which she added another she’d just invented), and implying my exceedingly
grave complaint was a load of rubbish.
50.
She says, ‘He
contends that he had identified a multitude of reversible, fundamental, and
critical procedural and evidential errors made by the trial Judge, and believed
he’d had objectively justified sound grounds of appeal’, which statement,
although quite correct, she leaves in the air, as if it’s doubtful.
51.
But the labour judge himself
ultimately implicitly admitted his fundamental ‘procedural
… error’ as to who carried the final burden of proof in the case.[42]
And in their decision on appeal against Mlambo JP regarding my complaints that
he lied to the Minister and to Parliament in giving his false ‘budgetary
constraints’ alibi for the silent, unrecorded, illegal backroom abortion of
my appointment, Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka recognised precisely the labour
judge’s ‘evidential errors’ in
accepting LASA’s lying, unsupported, contradictory, objectively contradicted,
radically different, mutually contradictory and destructive excuses for aborting
my recruitment,[43]
immediately after the selection panel recommended me and disqualified and
rejected my rival applicant for not meeting the advertised qualifying criteria,
namely a Zulu attorney, a repeatedly appointed acting judge of the Labour Court
over a period of about six years before his interview for the post.
52.
The main thing is, though,
that the merits of my labour case on appeal were completely different from and
immaterial to the merits of my case against the Respondent in my complaint
against him, which is that in breach of his judicial oath he yielded to improper
influence in dismissing my petition for leave to appeal.
AD PARA 5
53.
With studied vagueness, Judge
Goliath omits to mention exactly what it was about ‘the
manner in which the petition was dealt with by the Appeal Court’, which I
indeed ‘criticised’, namely that –
besides the improper influence issue – my petition had been dismissed
irregularly prematurely and unlawfully:
(a) before LASA’s interlocutory application for condonation for opposing me out
of time had been answered by me, even as I still had time available under the
court rules to file (thus violating natural justice by denying me the benefit of
the audi alteram partem rule);
(b) before LASA had replied to this intended answering affidavit of mine,
exposing its lies under oath, if it wanted to try doing so – the lies under oath
its in-house corporate attorney had told the Respondent in fabricating an
untruthfully false case for seeking his pardon for not complying with the Labour
Court Rules, prescribing just ten days for filing both petitions and then
opposing papers;
(c) before the Respondent had considered, evaluated and decided on the complete
set of application papers whether LASA had a true case for condonation, in light
of my intended demonstration that it was an objectively demonstrable
fabrication, meaning a pack of lies; in other words before the Respondent had
considered, evaluated and decided LASA’s condonation application in his
otherwise usual thoughtful manner – as witness, in sharp contrast, his
extensive, carefully considered judgment in such a condonation application in
the Eberspächer case, cited in paragraph 19.2 of my complaint.
And although not part of my complaint – being the intended subject of a second
one to follow – I pointed out that my petition was not in fact ‘dealt with by the Appeal
Court’ of three appeal judges, as required by the Labour Court Rules for the
decision of petitions for leave to appeal, but by the Respondent alone, on his
own, as court records that I dug out during my thorough investigation of the
whole mess proved irrefragably.
54.
Judge Goliath obligingly
discounts the shockingly false, insulting denigration of me personally by the
anonymous author of the ‘memorandum’ as having been merely ‘critical’
– a respectable, neutral word, suggesting there was substance to the criticism –
rather than a lying depiction of me, contrived to poison and prejudice the
Respondent against me by portraying me as a low-life, even before he got to look
my case on petition for leave to appeal Cele J’s bungled judgment in LASA’s
favour.[44]
55.
Again Judge Goliath says very
misleadingly that the ‘memorandum’ ‘contained
information relating to the dispute between him and LASA and commented on the
merits of his petition’. As I showed in my complaint, however, the ‘information relating to the dispute’ that it contained was utterly
false. In other words, it wasn’t ‘information’,
it was a heap of lies – lies about the issues on trial before the Labour Court
and more lies about the issues on petition before the Labour Appeal Court.And
the ‘memorandum’ never ‘commented on the
merits of his petition’ either, as Judge Goliath discounts it so sweetly.
Quite the contrary, as my complaint details, it told more blatant lies to paint
my petition as baseless and fit only for the trash can.
AD PARA 6
56.
Judge Goliath states
completely and untruthfully falsely, ‘He
contends that the panel of judges relied on the memorandum to summarily dismiss
his petition’. In truth and in fact, I contended no such thing; quite the
opposite.
57.
As said, I discovered that
the ‘panel of judges’ named in the
dismissal order were in different courts all over the country on the day it’s
falsely alleged in the order that they deliberated together in Durban and
decided to dismiss my petition. And I pointedly said so in my complaint. But
that’s anyway not its main point, which is that the Respondent dismissed my
petition under improper influence.
AD PARA 7
58.
In this garrulous paragraph,
Judge Goliath doesn’t remark on the salient fact that on the Respondent’s own
version LASA’s out-of-time affidavit opposing my petition was not properly
before him, with the result that that the petition case, both for and against,
wasn’t ripe for consideration and decision. She finds nothing remiss in the
Respondent casually disregarding his own court’s precisely regulated processes
for the orderly and just adjudication of disputes, having strikingly
contrariwise given the excuse given by another condonation applicant in other
litigation[45]
the most careful attention, and putting it under the magnifying glass.
59.
I’ve shown that ‘the three judges’ never ‘duly
considered the complainant’s petition’, first because it wasn’t ripe for
consideration and decision, so it wasn’t ‘duly
considered’; secondly because they were in different places on the day it’s
alleged they sat together, so didn’t consider it at all; and thirdly because
even a wet-behind-the-ears law student in his first year would appreciate
instantly that a trial judge’s misallocation of the final onus of proof onto the
plaintiff instead of the defendant completely misdirects his adjudication of the
main dispute, is a radical error entirely vitiating his judgment and affords an
eminently arguable ground for appeal – meaning my petition was obviously merited
on this solid ground alone. And it’s absolutely inconceivable that Davis and
Sutherland JJA would have missed my point on petition that the trial judge wrote
his judgment upside down.
60.
This is quite aside from the
transparent falsity of LASA’s ‘budgetary
constraints’ justification for not appointing me, later readily recognised
by Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka – which financial justification LASA’s National
Operations Executive (‘NOE’) changed completely, telling a totally different,
contradictory story (actually two new stories) both to LASA’s board (as Justices
Nkabinde and Makgoka also noted) and to the labour judge, along with the
financial one, all strangely unnoticed and unremarked by him, as I pressed in my
petition. Again Davis and Sutherland JJA would never have missed the obvious
trouble with LASA’s defence case that Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka saw so
easily. Because like the latter, the former are very intelligent, experienced,
competent, and unquestionably honest judges.
61.
But we’re supposed to believe
that, unlike Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka, the Respondent, Davis and Sutherland
JJA were dull and insensible to the obvious merits of my petition and really
thought I’d advanced no arguable case for appeal and for reversing the labour
judge’s plainly incorrect dismissal of my claim on a profusion of procedural and
evidential grounds.[46]
62.
Sure the ordinary practice of
the registrar is that he ‘collects the
petitions, makes copies of relevant documents, collates them and places them in
three individual files and has it delivered to the three judges who are
allocated the petitions’, so all this fluff is quite pointless. The issue
before Judge Goliath was whether the Respondent rejected my petition illegally,
suborned to do so by that poisonous, disparaging, and lying criminal
‘memorandum’.
63.
And sure in the ordinary
course, ‘All petitions are considered on
the same day in the boardroom after appropriate debate.’ Trouble is, on the
‘same day’ the dismissal order claims
the three judges sat together and decided to dismiss my petition, they couldn’t
have ‘met in the boardroom’ at the
Durban Labour- and Labour Appeal Courts to ‘debate’
the obvious merits of my petition, because as my investigation revealed they
were in different courts in different parts of the country. So my petition
couldn’t have been ‘properly considered
and refused’ by the three of them ‘in
the boardroom’.
AD PARA 8
64.
As I showed in my invited
comments on the Respondent’s response, his waffle about the Labour Appeal Court
having its own files, different from the Labour Court files, is just slimy
diversion to throw sand in the reader’s eyes and escape the pinch of my
complaint, because as noted in my comments, the ‘memorandum’ was found precisely
in the Labour Appeal Court case file in Durban and not in the Labour Court file
there. But Judge Goliath doesn’t deal with this. She lets the Respondent’s
greasy chicanery pass without comment.
65.
Of course Mlambo JP has no
proper ‘role to play in the decisions of
the Labour Appeal Court.’ This is more high-toned distraction. I’m satisfied
that he did indeed ‘play’ a criminal ‘role’
in the ‘decision’ of my petition by then-‘Labour Appeal Court’ Judge President Waglay, the Respondent, acting
alone, but this was not an issue or charge relevant and necessary for Judge
Goliath to decide.
66.
For the Respondent to say he
‘denies that any irregularities occurred
in the handling of the complainant’s petition’ is as ridiculous as a child
caught with a pocket full of stolen sweets saying, ‘I never.’ Fact is, there
were multiple objectively evident irregularities, and they aren’t even denied:
My petition was rejected before all the prescribed papers were in and the matter
was ready for decision; I found a ‘memorandum’ in the appeal court case file
insulting me and making out that my case on petition was worthless, effectively
importuning the Respondent to throw it out as unmerited; and Davis and
Sutherland JJA, who, unlike the Respondent, I know to be honest judges, will
confirm that they had no hand in the decision of the matter because they weren’t
in the boardroom of the Labour Appeal Court at Durban on the day the dismissal
order falsely claims they considered my petition together there and decided it
made no arguable case for appeal. As if she were the Respondent’s defence
attorney, Judge Goliath mechanically and dutifully repeats the Respondent’s
laughably lame line: he ‘denies that any
irregularities occurred in the handling of the complainant’s petition’.
67.
On the Respondent’s version,
he, Davis and Sutherland JJA all reckoned a trial judge’s misallocation of the
final burden of persuasion, totally and radically misdirecting his approach to
the evidence, isn’t the most basic, fatal, and eminently appealable and
reversible error.
68.
On the Respondent’s version,
he, Davis and Sutherland JJA all reckoned the fact that LASA’s bogus ‘budgetary constraints’ defence was unsupported and contradicted by
its own records, and that there was no record whatsoever of any decision to
freeze the post for which I’d just been duly picked, was not a ground for
appealing the trial judge’s acceptance of LASA’s story that my post was frozen
for want of funds to fill it, despite that fact that, quite the contrary, the
record shows that LASA’s Board pertinently prioritised such critical posts for
filling during some transient budgetary uncertainty in 2010 concerning when LASA
could expect the transfer of funding for budgeted salary increases, to which
LASA’s Board responded by resolving to temporarily stall recruitment to some
entry-level posts only, and for just two months in the result, after which the
rate at which LASA filled its vacant posts rocketed. But somehow not the top
post I’d won fair and square, even as a white man in the New South Africa.
69.
On the Respondent’s version,
he, Davis and Sutherland JJA all reckoned that LASA’s single witness’s
contradiction of this pleaded ‘budgetary
constraints’ defence – by giving evidence at trial of two completely
different, mutually destructive stories, which he’d invented and told the Board
as the reason I wasn’t appointed – did not afford a viable ground for arguing on
appeal that the labour judge had mistakenly accepted LASA’s original pleaded ‘budgetary
constraints’ defence for not having appointed me – equally unsupported and
objectively contradicted by LASA’s own records.
70.
On the Respondent’s version,
he, Davis and Sutherland JJA all sat together in the boardroom at the Durban
Labour- and Labour Appeal Courts and thoughtfully discussed and debated all
these points raised in my petition, and all of them agreed with each other that
none of these points afforded good grounds for appeal. Even as Justices Nkabinde
and Makgoka had no difficulty recognising that LASA’s ‘budgetary
constraints’ story for not appointing me and its claim to have frozen the
post for which I’d just been picked – which story Mlambo JP told the Justice
Minister and Justice Portfolio Committee – were transparent, stupid lies.
71.
On the Respondent’s version,
such experienced, intelligent, competent, and honest judges as Davis and
Sutherland JJA were unable to see all these glaring problems with the Labour
Court’s judgment enumerated in my petition, bristling with footnoted references
to the case document-bundles comprising hundreds of pages each, and didn’t think
these problems constituted arguable grounds for appeal.
72.
No one with any brains would
believe this.
AD PARA 9
73.
All this is correct, at least
as at the material time. (I hear that LASA’s staff establishment has since been
restructured, but I don’t know for sure.)
AD PARA 10
74.
This incoherent nonsense by
Judge Goliath discloses her deplorably lazy inattention to the recorded facts
right in front of her.
75.
She persistently claims my
petition was decided by the three said judges as if this is common cause, when
my complaint clearly puts this in issue, even stating that this fraud – the
disposal of my petition by the Respondent alone, contrary to the false claim of
the dismissal order – would be the subject of a second complaint to follow the
instant complaint, headed ‘First Complaint’
accordingly.[47]
76.
Contrary to her absurd claim
about this, I obviously didn’t ‘concede’
that ‘LASA came to court late to oppose
the petition’. Quite the opposite, I raised it and I objected to it.[48]
77.
Her claim in her decision
that ‘the complainant … objects to the
fact that he was not given an opportunity to answer LASA’s opposing affidavit’
is absolutely and untruthfully false.
78.
What I actually objected to
was the Respondent’s denial of my opportunity to answer and refute LASA’s case
for condonation, and to show that its excuses given under oath for coming to
court late were objectively refutable, easily exposed lies, in keeping with the
culture of casual criminal mendacity I’d encountered in that phenomenally
corrupt organisation. Which lies about coming late obviously bore on the
credibility of the lies it told in its out-of-time affidavit opposing my
petition.
79.
But my complaint to the JCC
is not this gross procedural irregularity in denying me my right under the rules
of court to answer and refute LASA’s lying excuses for opposing my petition out
of time – which irregularity would have been a matter for judicial review by the
High Court. My complaint is that after reading the ‘memorandum’, the Respondent
obliged its criminal author by corruptly throwing my petition out on the turn.
80.
In doing this, the Respondent
didn’t think to make a pretence of following due process in the disposal of my
petition (a) by waiting for the filing of my answering affidavit refuting LASA’s
lying case for condonation and then for LASA’s filing of its reply; and (b) by
deciding the interlocutory application before rejecting my petition – as he’d
immediately decided to do on reading that ‘memorandum’ portraying me as a
reprobate and my petition as a waste of time and not worth the bother of
studying and debating it with his brother judges of appeal.
81.
Judge Goliath continues
waffling in tragically broken logic, gushing more patent nonsense, and just
making stuff up as she goes along, all of it to deflect from the burning point
of my complaint: ‘However, Waglay JP
indicated that the application for condonation was not considered by the bench.
Consequently, the complainant was not prejudiced in any manner, as it is evident
that the judges considered the petition on the basis of the trial court record.
In other words, the petition was duly considered based on the merits of the case.’
82.
We all know LASA’s
condonation application wasn’t considered. As said in my complaint, with
reference to a judgment of his in another condonation case, the Respondent
ordinarily took such applications seriously and carefully examined and assessed
the excuse(s) advanced by the party seeking pardon for not complying with the
timeframes prescribed by the rules of court – but not in my case, despite my
notice of objection,[49]
enumerating my reasons for opposing LASA’s late filing of its prodigiously
perjured affidavit opposing my petition, promptly followed by a supporting
affidavit.[50]
83.
Just sucking it out of her
thumb, Judge Goliath claims ‘it is evident
that the judges considered the petition on the basis of the trial court record.’
In truth and in fact, and contrary to her pure invention and misrepresentation
about this, ‘the trial court record’’
wasn’t before the Respondent when my petition was thrown out.
84.
Under the Labour Court Rules, a petition
for leave to appeal is decided on a consideration of its case made on oath in
its supporting affidavit and the opposite party’s grounds of opposition, set out
on oath in its opposing affidavit, and nothing else. The point of the affidavit
requirement is to scare the parties to tell the perfect truth and not tell lies
under oath and be sent to jail for them. (As I discovered litigating against
LASA, where lying on oath is a way of life, being corrupt from the top down,
this measure never achieved its intended purpose to get the truth stated and
nothing else.)[51]
85.
Only in Judge Goliath’s
dreams was it ‘evident that the judges
considered the petition on the basis of the trial court record.’
86.
With that false premise down
the pipe, her corollary ‘In other words, the petition was duly considered based on the merits of
the case’ follows with the next flush.
AD PARA 11
87.
It’s marvellous that Judge
Goliath should advise me so assuredly and so very ignorantly that ‘The complainant incorrectly assumes that the outcome of the appeal would
have been different had he been given an opportunity to respond to the
condonation application of LASA, as well as their opposing papers.’
Actually, under the court rules I had no ‘opportunity
to respond to …their opposing papers.’ This is because, as said above,
unlike an application, a petition case before the Labour Appeal Court comprises
only a petition and its supporting affidavit, and the respondent’s opposing
affidavit, and that’s it – no reply, no ‘opportunity
to respond to …their opposing papers.’
88.
And this is why, in not
troubling to file its opposing affidavit within ten days of my petition – which
petition I’d duly filed within my own ten days allowed after the labour judge’s
dismissal of my application for leave to appeal[52]
– LASA dropped into my lap a Heaven-sent opportunity to show in my intended
answering affidavit opposing its condonation application that, as I pointed out
in my notice of objection,[53]
and demonstrated in an affidavit[54]
supporting it, LASA’s affidavit opposing my petition was:
‘out of time and non-compliant with Labour
Appeal Court rule 4(6); comprises hearsay on all material points, unconfirmed
and uncorroborated by the respondent’s National Operations Executive and Chief
Executive Officer directly involved in and having personal knowledge of the
case; repeatedly contradicts the respondent’s own case at trial, and in its
pleadings, interlocutory affidavits, reports and correspondence; contains novel
false claims not made at trial and in the respondent’s pleadings, interlocutory
affidavits, reports and correspondence; conflates unrelated and irrelevant facts
and issues in a new manner at odds with the respondent’s case at trial; is
dishonest, misleading, and shot through with demonstrable perjury; employs red
herrings to distract from the documented, objective facts inconsistent with and
destructive of the defence version, which hard facts summarised in the petition
the respondent entirely avoids answering; falsely disputes the trial court’s
finding that the respondent’s single witness was shown to be repeatedly
mendacious in his evidence; and further falsely disputes the petitioner’s exact
quotation of the judge’s language in making this finding; and, repeatedly
resorts to meretricious displays of high-toned indignation, baseless attacks on
the petitioner’s personal and professional integrity, obloquy, and derision to
prejudice the court against the petitioner and to distract from the merits of
his case and the gravity of his contentions, particularly apropos the
misconduct, on the record, of the respondent’s Board chairperson Mlambo JP in
the matter, – all intended to pervert the just decision of the petition on an
appraisal of the objectively established facts, and all precisely identified in
the petitioner’s supporting affidavit to follow.’
89.
So in stating ‘The complainant incorrectly assumes that the outcome of the appeal would
have been different had he been given an opportunity to respond to the
condonation application of LASA, as well as their opposing papers’, Judge
Goliath doesn’t know what she’s talking about.
90.
Her soothing bromide that ‘Ultimately, the petition can only be determined on its merits’ ducks
the entire point of my complaint, which is that in my particular case my
petition indubitably wasn’t ‘determined on
its merits’. It was rejected on account of that ‘memorandum’ instructing the
Respondent to bin it.
91.
Judge Goliath’s pitifully
confused, tendentious claim to protect her accused brother judge that ‘the complainant was not prejudiced in any manner because the application
for condonation was filed late, and not considered by the court’ mixes up
LASA’s opposing affidavit, which was indeed ‘filed late’, and its ‘application
for condonation’, which wasn’t.
92.
The truly honest reader might
fairly wonder whether Judge Goliath didn’t write this shameful junk after a long
Friday lunch.
93.
As stated above, in not
waiting for my answering affidavit opposing LASA’s condonation application, the
Respondent grossly irregularly and unlawfully stole from me the God-given
windfall presented by LASA’s failure to oppose me in time, and by its blatantly
perjured case for condonation, that I would otherwise never have enjoyed under
the Labour Court Rules, namely to dismantle and refute, with hard records put
up, its lying excuses for coming to court late, along with all the other lies
and dirt in its papers, as outlined above. In other words, Judge Goliath’s airy
assertion that I ‘was not prejudiced in
any manner’ is flat wrong.
AD PARA 12
94.
If all this isn’t clueless enough, Judge Goliath really hits her stride here as
a DEI judge: ‘Similarly, the contents of
an anonymous memorandum cannot have any bearing on a consideration of the merits
of a petition.’ This is as ludicrous as saying a bribe proved to have been
paid to a judge ‘cannot have any bearing
on a consideration of the merits of ‘a case before him. The assertion is so
utterly foolish on its face that it warrants no further unpicking, save to say
the clear merits of my petition were plainly never considered.
95.
And then, just when you think
it can’t get any worse: ‘In any event, if the complainant is aggrieved by the
outcome of a petition, he is at liberty to resort to further legal remedies.’ But my grievance before the JCC
was not ‘the outcome of [my] petition’;
it was that the Respondent disposed of it corruptly, having been improperly
influenced by the criminal author of that criminal ‘memorandum’, in flagrant
breach of his judicial oath.
96.
Judge Goliath’s unambiguous insinuation that I shouldn’t have complained to the
JCC about the Respondent’s corruption, but that I ought rather to have turned to
the courts and/or the police and pursued my ‘further
legal remedies’ with them is not just risibly asinine, it’s contrived to run
cover for the documented judicial corruption of her fellow co-ethnic Cape Town
judge, a likely professional friend or good acquaintance of hers.
97.
I duly filed an impeachable judicial misconduct complaint against the corrupt
judge under section 14 of the JSC Act, with a view to seeing him impeached and
removed from the bench by the National Asembly. In other words, my objective was
to have him disciplined as hard as the Constitution envisages. That the High
Court had jurisdiction to review and set aside the iregular and corrupt dismisal
of my petition,[55] and that the police
could have investigated a criminal charge of defeating the ends of justice, was
another matter altogether and quite irrelevant to the determination of my
complaint duly made to the JCC.
98.
Judge Goliath admonishes me huffing
and puffing: ‘The complainant is legally
trained and should be fully aware that he should desist from making
unsubstantiated statements of improper influence.’ Now as a seasoned trial
lawyer of four decades vintage with ample experience on both sides of the bar[56] and bench, and a
stirling record on appeal, I’m full well aware, and entirely agree, that ‘Allegations
of dishonesty against judges are serious. Thus, they should never be made unless
there is evidence to support them’, as the Judicial Conduct Tribunal held in
paragraph 19 of its decision of the Justices of the Constitutional Court’s
complaint against John Hlophe JP delivered on 9 April 2021.
99.
But my complaint of improper
influence in the decision of my petition was indeed ‘substantiated’’: by the photocopy of the ‘memorandum’ made by the
registrar; by the registrar’s certification of an inventory of the appeal court
file’s contents including this ‘memorandum’; and by the peculiar, procedurally
irregular and thus unlawful circumstances in which my petition was prematurely
rejected, which tipped me to something remiss and set me investigating. Only to
discover horrors in the appeal court file and in other court records beyond my
wildest imagination, even in the New South Africa, in which, as is universally
known, the rankest corruption is completely normal across all tiers of state,
from the President down to my local municipality.
100.
So Judge Goliath’s rebuke of me is
not just unfounded, it’s patently false. It’s contrived to divert attention from
the corrupt judge, by fingering me as the miscreant in the matter instead of
him. As clear as crystal, her crooked game is to flip the narrative by
substituting the complainant for the accused and
vice versa, the better to assist the guilty Respondent escape being
held to account for his impeachable corruption.
101.
Judge Goliath says, ‘Lastly,
the complainant also unequivocally referred to the handling of his matter as a
violation of his fundamental rights to access to courts which are guaranteed by
section 34 of the Constitution, which itself would trigger constitutional
remedies.’ All this high falutin jive to dupe the dull-witted is not only
perfectly irrelevant, it obfuscates the sharp point of my complaint, which is
that the Respondent threw my case under improper influence.
102.
She concludes, ‘In my view all the
allegations of impropriety on the part of the judicial officers, including
Mlambo JP, is unfounded and speculative.’ Her alleged ‘view’ is palpably irrational. My ‘allegations’ that the Respondent violated his judicial oath in
corruptly rejecting my petition, moved to do so by that criminal ‘memorandum’,
is precisely ‘..founded’ on the real
evidence of its existence in the appeal case file; on the photocopy made of it
by the court registrar; and on the inventory of the file’s contents he
certified, both of which key documents I put up in support of my complaint –
considered against the undisputed evidence that the Respondent rejected my
petition irregularly prematurely before the case was ripe for decision, because
LASA’s condonation application was in mid flight; I hadn’t answered it yet; LASA
hadn’t replied to me; the condonation application hadn’t been decided; and
LASA’s affidavit opposing my petition, filed out of time, wasn’t properly before
the court. Against the fact also that, in bright contradistinction, the law
reports show the Respondent, unlike in the instant case, ordinarily took
condonations very seriously, and carefully canvassed and evaluated the
explanation advanced for not complying with the rules of court and not filing in
the prescribed time.
103.
So my complaint that the Respondent corruptly rejected my petition can hardly be
discounted rationally as ‘speculative’
by any honest person with an IQ above room temperature. By untruthfully
portraying my complaint in this way, Judge Goliath’s unmistakeable intention was
to sweep it under the carpet in defence of her brother judge.
104.
Then-LASA board chairman Mlambo JP, who I’m satisfied authored the ‘memorandum’,[57] is not the formal
accused in my complaint, and no finding for or against him is/was relevant in
deciding it.
AD PARA 13
105.
Judge Goliath’s claim that
she’s ‘satisfied that there is no evidence
of any irregular or improper conduct by Waglay JP in the handling of the
complainant’s petition’ and that ‘the
complaint lacks substance and falls to be dismissed’ would be a flat joke
were her conduct in covering for her corrupt judicial colleague so manifestly
indefensible, so egregiously unethical, and so corrupt in itself.
106.
Unfortunately, however, as I
learned from Justices Dumisani Zondi[58]
and Rammaka Mathopo’s[59]
acquittal of Mlambo JP in the teeth of all the documentary and other evidence
I’d stacked against him, followed by the JSC’s cursory rejection[60]
of Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka’s magnificently careful, finely detailed review
of this evidence and finding that it set up an answerable case fit for trial
before a Judicial Conduct Tribunal, JSC and JCC judges covering for corrupt
judges has been unexceptional in the New South Africa. At least before Maya CJ
and Madlanga DCJ took over the leadership of these bodies.
107.
The dismissal of my complaint
against the Respondent obviously falls to be set aside, with (a) a finding that
I’ve established an answerable case against the Respondent, namely that acting
under improper influence he corruptly rejected my petition for leave to appeal
the dismissal of my labour claim against LASA, and (b) that the complaint should
be investigated by a Judicial Conduct Tribunal.
108.
In which event, on being so
advised, I’ll immediately draw and file that long-intended Second Complaint
about the Respondent’s fraudulent dissimulation to me in his dismissal order,
issued by his registrar on his instructions, that Appeal Judges Davis and
Sutherland sat with him in the boardroom of the Durban Labour- and Labour Appeal
Courts on the date stated in the order; saw fit and agreed to consider the case
before LASA’s condonation application was ripe for decision on all the
prescribed papers, before that crucial interlocutory application had been
decided and LASA’s out-of-time affidavit opposing my petition was properly
before court; and that they debated the merits of my petition together and
unanimously agreed it was a pile of trash without any viably arguable points for
appeal, and dismissed it. The two impeachable complaints can then be decided by
a Tribunal together. (In the most unlikely event that the JCC Appeal Committee
closes ranks around the Respondent – as Zondi JA and Mathopo J did around Mlambo
JP[61]
– and this appeal is dismissed, I obviously won’t bother drawing that second
complaint, and will pursue elsewhere the unprecedented judicial corruption I’ve
proved in this matter.)
109.
Wherefore I seek (a) a
finding by you, the Honourable Justices on the JCC Appeal Committee considering
this appeal, that I’ve set out good grounds for appealing Judge Goliath’s
shambolic, irrational, unsustainable decision to dismiss my complaint, and that
I’ve indeed made a facially answerable case against the Respondent, and (b) a
ruling that Judge Goliath’s decision be set aside and substituted with a
recommendation under section 17(4)(c) that the JCC propose to the JSC that it
request the President to appoint a Judicial Conduct Tribunal to investigate and
try my complaint.
Signed electronically at Eshowe on 12 March 2025
ANTHONY BRINK
ADVOCATE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
APPELLANT
36
Pearson Street, Eshowe, KwaZulu-Natal
anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com
083 779 4174
[1] And for
information to:
The Honourable Dana M. Brown, Acting United
States Ambassador to South Africa;
And other interested parties.
Covering emails are accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/Waglay_JP/Appeal-notice-copied-to.
[2] The JSC
Secretary oddly allocated the same reference number to my complaint
against Waglay JP as it did to my complaints against Mlambo JP, filed
around the same time.
[3] My
complaint and all further case documents, including this appeal notice,
are accessible at corrupt‑judges.co.za/Waglay_JP.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
Ibid.
[6] I detail
this in paragraphs 18-24 of my letter to Maya CJ on 31 January 2025,
mentioned in paragraph 9 below and accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/Waglay_JP/Final_demand.
[7] Mogoeng CJ
undoubtedly passed my two letters to him on to Zondo DCJ, being the
delegated head of the JCC finally responsible for seeing to the decision
of my complaint.
[8] All this
correspondence, acknowledged by then-Judiciary Spokesman Nathi Mncube,
is accessible online at corrupt-judges.co.za/Correspondence.
[9] My letters
concerned also the JCC’s failure at the time to have resolved my eight
complaints against Dunstan Mlambo JP, including my criminal and other
capital complaints against him, subsequently found well made by the JCC
Appeal Committee, discussed below.
[10]
During the hearings, then-Acting SSA DG
Loyiso Jafta testified about ‘Project Justice’, a rogue SSA operation to
bribe unnamed judges for factional political ends, at least one of whom
he said was suspected on strong circumstantial grounds of having indeed
been so bribed. Jafta’s evidence in this regard was corroborated by
former Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi, who’d recently
chaired a high-level review of the SSA, and who also testified before
the commission. And by other protected witnesses as well. (The
then-Minister of State Security reportedly tried preventing Jafta giving
this evidence, came out denying it, and sacked him soon afterwards.)
Former SSA DG Fraser has the names of these corrupt judges – so his
counsel Muzi Sikhakane SC stated when appearing before the Commission on
his behalf. Here’s a video clip of him saying so, at 1min 50sec:
corrupt-judges.co.za/Sikhakane_at_Zondo_Commission.mp4
[11] See
corrupt-judges.co.za/Mlambo_JP. The JSC’s decision is headed for
judicial review, precisely as then-JSC Chairperson Zondo CJ chairing the
meeting repeatedly warned and predicted – on account of his fellow
commissioner’s deliberate violation of my right to respond to the masses
of new (false) evidence and documents Mlambo JP slipped into what ought
to have been his submissions only, without my knowledge until I obtained
under PAIA the transcript of the JSC meeting and a copy of these
irregular and mendacious submissions.
[12] The
Report can be accessed at corrupt-judges.co.za/SSA, along with the
responses it drew, including then‑Chief Justice Zondo’s shockingly
cavalier, prejudicial rejection of my judicial corruption allegations
summarised in it, still pending before the JCC (thus misconducting
himself
á la the Hlophe JP impeachment case), as well as newspaper
reporting on its ‘false “judicial
corruption” claims’. But quite the contrary, just a couple of months
later, the JCC Appeal Committee majority concluded its commendably
conscientious 42-page review of the documentary and other evidence I’d
adduced in my complaints against Mlambo JP and found my four criminal
and other impeachable charges against him well made and answerable, and
recommended that he be called to answer them before a Judicial Conduct
Tribunal. All case documents in that matter are accessible at
www.corrupt-judges.co.za/Mlambo_JP. These include the JCC Appeal
Committee’s decision, and the transcript of the subsequent complete Goon
Show that passed for the JSC virtual meeting to consider the decision,
at which nine of the twelve commissioners rejected it without any
serious discussion, despite then‑JSC Chairperson Zondo CJ’s repeatedly
expressed warning that the proceedings were being conducted grossly
irregularly to my prejudice, and that if I was denied the benefit of the
audi alteram partem rule they
would be exposed to judicial review and being set aside accordingly.
(Indeed, the whole shambles is headed for review.)
[13] For which
reason, I entreated that a global final compromise settlement be
pursued, to put the whole kilombo
to bed.
[14] The
ensuing brouhaha in the newspapers over the Report, after a Member of
Parliament got hold of it and demanded a parliamentary enquiry into its
contents, appears to have spurred the long overdue, ultimately
successful, decision of my appeal in the Mlambo JP case, also mentioned
in the Report.
[15] These
reports are accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/SSA/Responses/Media.
[16] My letter
to Maya CJ is accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/Waglay_JP/Final_demand.
[17] Paragraph
33 of the said letter.
[18]
Paragraphs 31 and 32 of the said letter. As mentioned in para 35
thereof, all the papers in that litigation are accessible at
illegal-aid.co.za/JSC/PAIA/Application.
[19] For some
really hair-raising corruption both in the judiciary and at the JSC, see
Part Two of my previous PAIA request for JSC records, accessible at
illegal-aid.co.za/JSC/PAIA. To protect Mlambo JP, implicated in Part
Two, the JSC is strenuously resisting responding to the record requests
in that Part on manifestly spurious and bad faith grounds asserted in
its answering affidavit opposing my application to compel the delivery
of these refused records, namely that the records are both ‘privileged’
(which is not a ground for refusal permitted by PAIA, and anyway false,
because no litigation was pending against the JSC when the request was
made) and my request for them is ‘frivolous’ (when plainly my request
for all the very different records I’d specified was extraordinarily
serious, and the information the records contained was serious, hence
allegedly ‘privileged’ to hide it). Such was the lawless ineptitude and
corruption of the JSC, and its contempt for its constitutional
information transparency obligations, before Maya CJ took charge of it.
The court papers are accessible at
illegal‑aid.co.za/JSC/PAIA/Application.
[20] My
request for this record and the JSC’s response are accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/PAIA_2.
[21] Both the
decision and its covering email are accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/Waglay_JP.
[22] Letter to
Maya CJ, paragraph 24, accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/Waglay_JP/Final_demand.
[23] Per the
heading of section 15.
[24] She
briefly acted as head of the Western Cape High Court Division after
Hlophe JP was suspended:
news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosa-suspends-judge-president-hlophe-deputy-goliath-to-take-helm-20221214?form=MG0AV3
[25] See
paragraphs 22 and 23 below.
[26] For what
it's worth: since Judge Goliath mentioned section 15, its subsection 4
similarly requires that the JCC ‘Chairperson must inform the complainant
in writing of— (a) the reasons for the dismissal’.
[27]
judiciary.org.za/index.php/20-commission-personnel/deputy-chief-justice-raymond-zondo-chairperson/130-deputy-chief-justice-raymond-zondo-chairperson
[28]
thepresidency.gov.za/president-ramaphosa-appoints-justice-zondo-chief-justice?form=MG0AV3&form=MG0AV3
[29]
justice.gov.za/m_statements/2024/20240725-ChiefJusticeMaya.html?form=MG0AV3&form=MG0AV3
[30]
Subsection 1 provides: ‘If the
Chairperson is satisfied that, in the event of a valid complaint being
established, it is likely to lead to a finding by the Commission that
the respondent … is guilty of gross misconduct, as envisaged in section
14(4)(a), the Chairperson must— (a) refer the complaint to the Committee
in order to consider whether it should recommend to the Commission that
the complaint should be investigated and reported on by a Tribunal’.
[31] Per the
section heading.
[32] Per the
language of ‘section (2)(d)’,
to which section she referred at the conclusion of her decision.
[33] As Mlambo
JP billed himself to the JSC at his successful interview for the
presidency of the Gauteng Division of the High Court.
[34] A copy is
annexed to my complaint.
[35] Judgment
paragraph 65: ‘The applicant
accordingly carried the burden to prove the existence of the
discrimination he complained of’, and paragraph 67: ‘In
this matter the applicant had to surmount an arduous task of discharging
the onus resting on him through circumstantial evidence.’ Quite the
contrary, under Labour Law the ‘arduous
task’ fell on LASA to prove I hadn’t been discriminated against as
complained; and I bore zero final burden to prove I’d been discriminated
against once I’d set up a plausible case (which the judge accepted on
several pages of his judgment reviewing the circumstantial evidence that
I’d presented for this).
Given that (also from paragraph 67), ‘The
applicant pointed out a number of facts and circumstances in the case of
the respondent to suggest that Mr Nair was not generous with the truth
and that the respondent's version was a pretext’ – and the judge
didn't take issue with any of these pointers to the mendacity of LASA’s
single witness – had he approached his evaluation of the evidence from
the correct – that is opposite – direction, it’s unlikely that he’d have
believed Nair’s internally contradictory, unsupported, objectively
contradicted lies.)
Cele J’s judgment is accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[36] My cause
of action, based on the then-available evidence. Years after the case, a
record I disgorged from LASA by suing for it under PAIA revealed my true
cause of action to have been simple nepotism. I deal with this in more
detail in footnote 39 shortly below.
[37] Cele J’s
dismissal of my application for leave to appeal is accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[38] Cele J’s
judgment dismissing my labour claim is accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[39] Sure I
chose not to take the matter on review, because under the law applicable
this would have been the wrong legal route to follow. I duly litigated
in the Labour Court under section 50 of the Employment Equity Act,
believing at the time on the information then available to me that I’d
been unfairly discriminated against. As mentioned above, information
that I eventually succeeded in disgorging from LASA very reluctantly via
PAIA litigation after my labour case revealed the actual problem to have
been just everyday jobs-for-pals corruption. Critically relevant
information about my rival applicant’s professional background contained
in the eventually surrendered unredacted selection panel’s
recommendation report had originally been concealed from me with a black
Koki marker pen, in criminal contravention of section 90 of PAIA.
[40] The
investigating judge ‘may obtain,
in the manner that he or she deems appropriate, any other information
which may be relevant to the complaint’.
[41] Discussed
below, the Respondent’s dissimulation in his dismissal order that they
concurred with him was/is the intended basis of a second complaint to
follow.
[42] See
paragraph 5 of Cele J’s refusal of leave to appeal, accessible at
corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[43] See
marked up material excerpts of their decision annexed hereto.
[44] Even
wrongly awarding massive costs against me in this
labour not civil case – in
doing so disregarding and flouting the relevant provisions of the Labour
Relations Act regarding costs in labour litigation, in which very
different award principles apply from those in civil litigation, as the
Constitutional Court has twice underscored in its decisions.
[45] Cited in
my complaint, paragraph 9.2.
[46] Since
LASA’s pleaded defence fell to pieces at trial, the judge ought to have
ruled that LASA had failed to discharge the reversed final onus it bore
to justify its abortion of my recruitment, and ought to have upheld my
claim. As said, I discovered years later, after suing LASA under PAIA,
that the real problem wasn’t unfair discrimination against me, as
appeared to me on all the available evidence at the time, it was just
plain old jobs-for-pals recruitment corruption.
[47] Since it
appeared as the years went by that the JCC wasn’t interested in deciding
my first complaint before it, I didn’t bother wasting my time drawing
and submitting this envisaged second complaint. Since what was the point
if it was just going to be dropped into the bottom drawer as well?
[48] As said,
I was ordinarily indulgent about time limits in my litigation against
LASA, but on this occasion I had specific strategic reasons to hold LASA
strictly to the court rules and to force it to make a condonation
application for not complying with them.
[49]
Accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[50]
Ibid
[51] The
website illegal-aid.co.za – ‘Your
criminal law firm’ – gives the full picture.
[52] Even as
he eventually practically admitted that he’d got the final onus of proof
wrong. And LASA itself conceded this.
[53]
Accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/LC.
[54]
Ibid.
[55] In fact,
I did indeed report the corrupt disposal of my petition to the High
Court at Pietermaritzburg. Showing by way of court records annexed to my
founding affidavit that the three appeal judges alleged to have decided
my petition together weren’t in Durban on the day the dismissal order
claimed they were, I was sent packing with a punitive costs order
against me for, you guessed, outrageously attacking the integrity of a
sitting judge. Such is the indifference of the judiciary in the New
South Africa to documented corruption in its ranks. The court papers are
accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/Pillay_J.
[56] No doubt
at Mlambo JP’s instance, LASA is currently trying to get me struck off
the roll of advocates for complaining of his corruption; see my letter
to Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka of 5 December 2024 reporting this,
accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/LPC. As described therein, LASA
(Mlambo JP) had already succeeded in getting me fired as a contract
magistrate and blacklisted from any further such appointments. Such are
the occupational detriments of taking on judicial corruption in the New
South Africa.
[57] As said,
Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka found my various complaints of criminal
and other impeachable dishonesty against Mlambo JP well made on the
documentary and other evidence I adduced in my four most serious
complaints against him, and recommended that he be called to answer them
before a Judicial Conduct Tribunal. See marked up material excerpts of
their decision annexed hereto.
[58] His
decision is accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/Mlambo_JP.
[59] His
dissent is accessible at corrupt-judges.co.za/Mlambo_JP.
[60] The JSC’s
decision, and the transcript I obtained under PAIA of its atrociously
irregular and unlawful handling of the matter during a virtual
conference to discuss the case, are accessible at
[61] JCC
member Zondi JA’s perfunctory dismissal of my eight criminal and other
impeachable complaints against Mlambo JP, and JCC Appeal Committee
member Mathopo J’s special pleading for and acquittal of him in his
minority dissent against Justices Nkabinde and Makgoka’s true decision
to uphold my appeal and recommend that Mlambo JP be tried before a
Judicial Conduct Tribunal, are accessible at
corrupt‑judges.co.za/Mlambo_JP.
***