

SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

The new address is:
33 Hoofd Street
Braampark Forum 3
Braamfontein
2198

Postal address remains as:
Private Bag X 2700
Houghton
2041

New Telephone number
011 877-3600
Fax numbers: 011 403-0682.



**SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
COMPLAINT FORM**

For office use only

Province:		City/Town:		Reference No	
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PART A: YOUR DETAILS

1. Name and surname

Anthony Brink

2. ID number

5902255116081

3. Race (information required for statistical purposes only)

White

4. Gender (information required for statistical purposes only)

Male

5. Address and contact numbers

36 Pearson Street, Eshowe 3815, KwaZulu-Natal.
anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com
083 779 4174

PART B: DETAILS OF PERSON ON WHOSE BEHALF YOU COMPLETE FORM (PERSON OR ORGANISATION)

6-11

N/A

PART C: THE COMPLAINT

12. Date

16 May 2019

13. Is it still happening

Yes. My fundamental right mentioned below continues to be violated.

14. Where did it happen

In the national office of Legal Aid SA, 29 De Beer Street, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, Gauteng.

15. If you know, which right(s) in the Bill of Rights was/ were violated or is/are being violated

Section 32(1)(a).

16. If you know, the full name(s) and surname(s) of person(s), association, organisation or organ of state who violated these rights, please tell us

Patrick Hundermark, Chief Legal Executive of Legal Aid SA.

17. Where can we contact them

At Legal Aid SA's national office address, given above. Its telephone number is 011 877 2000. Hundermark's email address is patrickh@legal-aid.co.za.

18. If you do not know his/her/its/their names, please tell us anything you do know about him/her/it/them

N/A

19. Did anybody see or hear what happened (only people who actually saw or heard what happened, not people who heard about it from someone else)

N/A

20. In your own words, tell us exactly what happened (include all information but be as brief as possible)

See particular of complaint annexed.

21. Have you reported the matter to anyone else

No.

22. Were any steps taken by the person/association/organisation/organ of state to resolve the matter

N/A

23. What outcome do you propose or expect from this complaint (tell us what you would like to achieve with this complaint and the relief sought)

The ultimate 'redress' I expect under section 184(2)(b) of the Constitution is that, acting upon the Commission's advice, Legal Aid SA ('LASA') information officer Vidhu Vedalankar reverses Hundermark's illegal and unconstitutional refusal to allow me access to LASA's records duly requested on 12 April 2019 under section 18 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA'), in the exercise of my fundamental right in our open democracy to information held by the state. And that Vedalankar, or one of her duly designated and delegated deputy information officers, duly complies with my request and furnishes me with the withheld records or certifies under section 23 of PAIA those that don't exist.

Section 83(3)(d) of PAIA empowers the Commission to 'recommend to a public or private body to make such changes in the manner in which it administers this Act as the Commission considers advisable'.

The Commission's corrective advice to information officer Vedalankar in the terms set out in paragraph 70 of the annexure to this complaint is likely to achieve the redress I seek, having regard to her exposure to a punitive personal costs order should she disregard this advice, and I'm constrained to sue under section 78 for access to the records Hundermark has illegally and unconstitutionally refused me.

In successfully prevailing on Vedalankar to duly comply with my request, the Commission will have discharged its special responsibility imposed on it by section 184(1) of the Constitution to '(a) promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights' and '(b) promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights'.

24. Do you need an interpreter when attending any proceedings, investigations or hearing at our offices

No.

25. Can we use your name in news reports or letters we write regarding this matter/complaint

Yes.

26. Please tell us how you heard about the South African Human Rights Commission (e g radio advert, newspaper, poster, from a friend, etc)

As an advocate of the High Court of South Africa, I'm obviously well aware of the existence of the SAHRC as one of our Chapter 9 institutions.



Signature of complainant

10 August 2019

PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINT

1. This is a complaint against Legal Aid SA ('LASA') Chief Legal Executive Patrick Hundermark arising from his illegal and unconstitutional denial of access to LASA's records, duly requested under section 18 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA'), in violation of my fundamental human right to public information held by the state, entrenched and guaranteed by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution: 'Everyone has the right of access to ... any information held by the state'.
2. Profoundly aggravating Hundermark's violation of my constitutional right to information is his corrupt motive for doing so, namely to obstruct justice by suppressing (further) evidence of a criminal cover-up of high level recruitment corruption and financial misconduct involving ongoing major contraventions of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, detailed in the contextual notes to Part Three of my request.
3. The Commission's powers and duties in handling this complaint are governed by the following constitutional and statutory provisions:
 - 3.1. Section 184(2) of the Constitution charges the SAHRC with the responsibilities '(a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights' and '(b) to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated'.
 - 3.2. Section 83(3) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA') empowers the SAHRC to '(b) monitor the implementation of this Act; c) if reasonably possible, on request, assist any person wishing to exercise a right contemplated in this Act; [and] (d) recommend to a public or private body that the body make such changes in the manner in which it administers this Act as the Commission considers advisable'.

- 3.3. Section 13(3)(a) of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 prescribes that the Commission ‘must ... assist’ human rights violation complainants like me ‘in so far as it is able’ to do so, so as to fulfil the Commission’s ‘Objects’ set out in section 2 of that Act, namely ‘(a) to promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights; (b) to promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights; and (c) to monitor and assess the observance of human rights in the Republic.’
4. On 12 April 2019 I lodged a request for access to certain of LASA’s public records under section 18 of PAIA with LASA information officer Vidhu Vedalankar. My request complied in all respects with the prescribed form and was delivered to her by ‘electronic mail’ as the section allows. Copies of my request and its covering email are annexed marked ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively.
5. Anticipating that my request would be illegally and unconstitutionally refused in LASA’s usual routine over the past decade, I simultaneously approached the Commission for support under section 83 in seeing to LASA’s compliance with it. A copy of my letter is annexed marked ‘C’.
6. I addressed my letter to the Commission’s deputy information officer Dr Shanelle van der Berg, incorrectly believing that she was director of its PAIA Unit – in fact disbanded, she later told me. The record of my email to Vedalankar (annexure ‘B’) covering my PAIA request vouches that I also attached a copy of my letter to Dr Van der Berg, and that I called Vedalankar’s attention to its contents. On 9 May 2019 I emailed Hundermark a hyperlink to my PAIA request and to my letter to Dr Van der Berg online (in a Dropbox folder) and likewise urged him to study it. My email to Hundermark is annexed marked ‘D’.
7. Dr Van der Berg duly responded to my appeal for the Commission’s support by engaging on ‘Friday 10 May 2019’ in ‘telephonic conversations’ with ‘two representatives’ of LASA, and three days later on 13 May provided Vedalankar and Hundermark with ‘advisory recommendations’ on how my PAIA request should be

responded to. Copying me in, her advice to them and her covering email to me, from which I've quoted, are annexed marked 'E' and 'F'.

8. Three days later Hundermark refused most of my request. His notice to this effect is undated, but its PDF metadata reveal that it was created on 16 May 2019. Annexed marked 'G' is a copy of his refusal, without the section 32 reports he annexed to it, which I've detached for concision. A screenshot of the metadata of his response, showing its date is annexed marked 'H'.

9. Hundermark's paragraph 1 begins with the casual lie that my request 'was received on 25 April 2019 after we had requested same.' In truth and in fact, this is the later date on which I sent a copy to LASA Corporate Legal Manager Solly Sekgota at his request, because, he told me, 'after my investigation, we are unable to locate the request' that I told him I'd emailed Vedalankar two weeks earlier on the 12th. Our email exchange about this is annexed marked 'J'. Unless Sekgota lied to me about this, my emailed request must therefore have either been manually deleted by Vedalankar or automatically routed to her junk or spam mail folder after she'd marked all and any email from me as such – consistent with Hundermark's announcement to me in March 2018, when refusing my previous request made to the Justice Department, but transferred to LASA under section 20, that all and any future PAIA requests I might make would be summarily rejected.

10. In short, Hundermark's response to my request on 16 May 2019 was unlawfully out of time, and contravened the maximum 30 day limit set by section 25. Since the Commission has got this wrong before, it bears pointing out that under section 4 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 the days prescribed in section 25 for responding to a PAIA request are calendar days, and not 'business days' as then PAIA Unit director Chantal Kisoona wrongly advised Hundermark in October 2010.

11. Hundermark's false claim in his paragraph 2 to be a deputy information officer is treated in my First Complaint below.

12. Hundermark's paragraph 3 opens with a display of dishonest chest-thumping, feebly contrived to intimidate me and distract from Vedalankar's several clear criminal lies to the Justice Portfolio Committee on 9 October 2012, told to pervert its inquiry into the discrepancy between reported budget expenditure and reported post occupancy at LASA – and more specifically, albeit not expressly stated by the Committee, LASA's deliberate, corruptly motivated, illegal failure to fill its three remaining vacant, budgeted and funded critical Senior Litigator posts, which I'll reported to the Committee, and about which its chairperson had corresponded with me.

13. Categorically refuted and exposed in the contextual note to Part Three of my request, Hundermark nonetheless stands by and implicitly persists with Vedalankar's criminal lies. My 'assertions and conclusions are baseless and defamatory', he says, and 'the veracity of same are [sic] denied. Legal Aid SA and its officials reserves [sic] their rights in law and will, if they elect to do so, respond at the appropriate forum and time.' (On Hundermark's advice, the same dishonest, empty threat was made in January 2011, namely to sue me for defamation, with the same corrupt aim: to deter me from insisting on lawful compliance with my initial PAIA requests of August and December 2010, which had been repeatedly illegally and unconstitutionally totally refused to prevent me discovering the corrupt reason my appointment to LASA's top legal professional position in Kwazulu-Natal had silently been illegally aborted off the record after I'd been duly selected and recommended for it: jobs-for-pals cronyism. As revealed by the very first record I'd duly requested – the selection panel's recommendation report – disgorged from LASA many years later after protracted dilatory, obstructive, defensive litigation.)

14. As he did before, Hundermark 'turned upside down' my forthright identification of gross 'illegality or impropriety' at LASA to 'make [me] look like' I'm on a 'on a vindictive crusade against [LASA's] innocent and squeaky-clean' CEO – to quote the language of Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng in paragraph 104 of *Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank* [2019] ZACC 29. In so doing, Hundermark again

displays his egregious dishonesty, more of which I show below, and his personal loyalty to the corrupt officers he's protecting rather than to his employer LASA as a public entity, in breach of his fiduciary duty owed LASA as a director of its Board.

FIRST COMPLAINT

15. In paragraph 2 of his refusal, Hundermark falsely claims to be 'the Deputy Information Officer' of LASA, and he bills himself as such again below his signature at the end. In fact, having regard to the peremptory provisions of section 17, 'Designation of deputy information officers, and delegation', he's not.

16. Section 17(6)(a) requires that the designation of a deputy information officer by an information officer 'must be in writing'. Unlike his fellow national management executives, National Operations Executive Brian Nair, Chief Operations Officer Jerry Makokoane, and (recently resigned) Legal Executive Thembile Mtati, all of whose written delegations I've seen, Hundermark holds no such written designation.

17. The high water mark of Hundermark's claim to be a duly designated and delegated deputy information officer appears in his answering affidavit in a PAIA application pending in the High Court at Pietermaritzburg (case 5239/18P), namely that LASA's PAIA manual informs the public that the 'CLE', i.e. Chief Legal Executive, is one of LASA's national deputy information officers.

18. But as subsection 1 of section 14, 'Manual on functions of, and index of records held by, public body', provides: '... the information officer ... must compile... a manual containing- ... (b) the [contact details] of every deputy information officer of the body designated in terms of section 17(1)'. And this presupposes that 'every deputy information officer' be 'designated in terms of section 17(1)'. Merely being described in LASA's PAIA manual as a designated deputy information officer obviously doesn't amount to being 'designated in terms of section 17(1)' 'in writing' in terms of section 17(6)(a).

19. So in the absence of a written designation by information officer Vedalankar, delegating to CLE Hundermark her 'power or duty conferred or imposed on that information officer by this Act', per section 17(3), the PAIA manual's description of the 'CLE' as a deputy information officer is incorrect, and Hundermark's claim to be a deputy information officer without a written delegation as such is bad.

20. It follows that Hundermark acted ultra vires and unlawfully in responding to my request, aside from the illegality and unconstitutionality of his response.

SECOND COMPLAINT

21. Part One, paragraph 1, of my request specifies all LASA's counsels' invoices for their services in drawing or settling its application to postpone the hearing of my three PAIA applications to the High Court at Pietermaritzburg on 15 March 2019, and for arguing LASA's postponement application on that day.

22. Hundermark refuses my request for access to these records on two different grounds – in neither case complying with section 25(3)(a), requiring that he 'state ... the provisions of this Act relied upon' to reject my request.

23. His first ground is that it's 'manifestly frivolous and vexatious'. Undoubtedly Hundermark is alluding to section 45(a), because it's the only section in Part 4 of Chapter 2, 'Grounds for Refusal of Access to Records', containing these words. (In fact, the section states 'or' not 'and'.)

24. Hundermark's refusal to allow me access to the fee-notes on this false basis is insupportable, and, in the language of the Supreme Court of Appeal ('SCA') in *Claase v Information Officer of South African Airways* (cited and quoted at page 4 of my letter to Dr Van der Berg), 'intentionally vexatious'. Objectively there's nothing 'manifestly frivolous and vexatious' about a request for access to such financial records. And subjectively Hundermark is well aware that my request is serious, because he knows from the contextual notes to my earlier requests for counsel's fee-notes for previous legal work done, and from my founding affidavits supporting my

section 78 applications to court to compel their discovery, that I intend using them, inter alia, in support of a complaint to the Auditor General about corruptly-driven, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure on legal fees since 2011 to prevent, obstruct and delay my access to other sorts of records, with a view to the personal recovery of these public funds from the delinquent officers who abused them on illegally and unconstitutionally obstructing and preventing my exercise of my fundamental right to information.

25. But even without such a serious reason for requesting such fee-notes, repeatedly stated in contextual notes and court affidavits before, *mere curiosity* as my motivation for making my request is a sufficient basis for my constitutional right to sight of them – so the Constitutional Court held in *Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission* [2018] ZACC 8, at paragraph 44:

PAIA affords any person the right of access to any information held by the state.⁵⁰ The person seeking the information need not give any explanation whatsoever as to why she or he requires the information. The person could be the classic busybody who wants access to information held by the state for the sake of it.

Footnote 50 refers to ‘Section 9(a)(i) of PAIA’.

26. Hundermark’s second ground for refusing my request for the fee-notes is that ‘the information falls within the prescripts of personal information of third parties and they refused to grant permission to release such information as required in terms of section 47 of PAIA.’

27. Again, although Hundermark unlawfully fails to ‘state ... the provisions of this Act relied upon’, he undoubtedly means to rely on section 34, because it’s the only section in Part 4 of Chapter 2, ‘Grounds for Refusal of Access to Records’, containing the words ‘personal information’.

28. In light of the definition of ‘personal information’ in section 1, ‘Definitions’, Hundermark’s reliance on section 34 is obviously indefensible.

29. Section 1 provides:

‘**personal information**’ means information relating to an identifiable natural person, including, but not limited to –

- a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of the person;
- b) information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of the person;
- c) any identifying number, symbol, email address, physical address, telephone number, location information, online identifier or other particular assigned to the person;
- d) the biometric information of the person;
- e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person;
- f) correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence;
- g) the views or opinions of another individual about the person; and
- h) the name of the person if it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the person,

but excludes information about an individual who has been dead for more than 20 years[.]

30. Plainly I’m not asking for any such ‘personal information’ ‘about an individual’ as section 1 defines it; I want to know, from the source records, what legal fees LASA paid its three advocates to push my three PAIA applications off the opposed

roll in the High Court on 15 March and thereby delay the hearing and judgment on my claims, and thus my access to the records I've been struggling to get out of LASA for several years now, as it corruptly, illegally and unconstitutionally blocks my access to them in contempt of my fundamental right to see them.

31. Under the heading, 'Mandatory protection of privacy of third party who is natural person', section 34, provides:

- (1) Subject to subsection (2), the information officer of a public body must refuse a request for access to a record of the body if its disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about a third party, including a deceased individual.
- (2) A record may not be refused in terms of subsection (1) insofar as it consists of information–
 - (a) about an individual who has consented in terms of section 48 or otherwise in writing to its disclosure to the requester concerned[.]

32. Clearly section 34 has no application whatsoever to LASA's counsels' fee-notes, which section Hundermark implicitly relies on when absurdly inappositely calling them 'personal information of third parties'.

33. The section anyway protects 'personal information about a third party', not '... of third parties', by which expression of his, not used in the Act, Hundermark implies LASA's counsel own the information in their invoices. Indeed, ignorant of the definition of a 'record' in section 1, LASA has repeatedly in the past falsely asserted that the records are its advocates' property.

34. Section 1 defines 'record' as follows:

- '**record**' of, or in relation to, a public or private body, means any recorded information–
 - (a) regardless of form or medium;

- (b) in the possession or under the control of that public or private body, respectively; and
- (c) whether or not it was created by that public or private body, respectively[.]

35. It follows that no consent of LASA's counsel for the disclosure of their fee-notes to me was necessary under section 48, and their refusal to consent (if in truth it was ever sought) was legally irrelevant.

36. In short, as I anticipated in my letter to Dr Van der Berg, besides being unlawful and unconstitutional, Hundermark's refusal of my request for the said invoices was, in the language of the SCA in *Claase*, 'intentionally vexatious'.

THIRD COMPLAINT

37. The records specified in Part One, paragraph 2, of my request are 'All travel and subsistence vouchers reflecting what LASA disbursed on travel and subsistence expenses for LASA's junior advocate and two in-house attorneys to attend to the said postponement application', and in this regard Dr Van der Berg counselled Vedalankar and Hundermark that they 'be disclosed, unless LASA has identified a ground for refusal which would render disclosure harmful.'

38. In contemptuous disregard for the Commission's advice to him, Hundermark refused to disclose these records to me, advancing completely different, contradictory grounds for not doing so.

39. His justification for refusing me access to the vouchers reflecting what LASA disbursed on its junior advocate's subsistence and travel expenses is that 'she has refused to grant permission to release such information as required in terms of section 47 of PAIA'.

40. Again for the third time, Hundermark fails to comply with section 25(3)(a) requiring that he 'state ... the provisions of this Act relied upon' to reject my request, and this time he provides no clues as to which of them he's intends.

41. Section 47, which he cites, is not among the 'Grounds for Refusal of Records' in Chapter 4 of Part 2 of the Act. Furthermore, the section never 'required' that the advocate 'grant permission to release such information' as Hundermark falsely alleges; rather, it imposes a duty on information officers to give 'Notice to third parties' if the record requested 'might be a record contemplated in section 34(1), 35(1), 36(1), 37(1) or 43(1)'. (Which one of these sections Hundermark has in mind, if any, he doesn't say.)

42. In alleging that 'she has refused to grant permission to release such information as required in terms of section 47 of PAIA', Hundermark implicitly accepted that my request for these particular subsistence and travel vouchers was seriously made and was not 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' as contemplated by section 45(a), because instead of summarily refusing my request as an obvious waste of time under that section, he (or one of his corporate attorneys) treated my request as seriously made and, on his version, accordingly sought the junior advocate's consent to the disclosure of the information.

43. But concerning exactly the same kind of vouchers, reflecting what LASA disbursed on its two in-house attorneys' subsistence and travel expenses, Hundermark changes his tune completely, and in doing so reveals his mala fides in refusing my requests. Now his layer-cake justifications for rejecting my request, in which he again fails to 'state ... the provisions of this Act relied upon' in compliance with section 25(3)(a), are that:

44. *First*: 'The records relating [to the] two in house attorneys is refused on the basis that it is manifestly frivolous and vexatious and further seeks to substantially and unreasonable [sic] divert the resources of Legal Aid SA' – a clear allusion to section 45, although the basis of this derision of my request isn't stated. Hundermark's bald allegation that my request is pointless and made to waste LASA's time is manifestly untrue and indefensible. Likewise that it would be

unduly burdensome to pull these records from the case file and copy them to me; in truth, it'll take no appreciable time at all.

45. As the history of LASA's refusals to comply with PAIA since 2013 shows, it has consistently invoked section 45 and mindlessly parroted it to hide records it doesn't want me to see and share with the authorities I've mentioned. My Special Report to the Commission in late 2016 recounts this. And as Hundermark's latest refusal shows, the crooked game continues.

46. *Second*: 'furthermore such request does not align to the prescripts and objectives of PAIA, namely to enable the requester to fully exercise his rights and protect such rights'. Only, this is the requirement for access to private body records, not public ones.

47. I canvass LASA's unbelievably stupid persistent confusion of the fundamentally different tests for entitlement to public and private body records in point 8 on page 16 of my letter to Dr Van der Berg – despite which the Chief Legal Executive of the largest law firm on the African continent tells me once again that I'm not entitled to access LASA's in-house attorneys' subsistence and travel expense vouchers because I don't need them to 'to fully exercise [my] rights and protect such rights', and that for this reason my request 'does not align to the prescripts and objectives of PAIA'.

48. Hundermark's gross misapplication and wilful abuse of the provisions of PAIA to suppress these cost records can only be described, in the language of the SCA in *Clause*, as 'intentionally vexatious'.

49. Apropos of Part Two of my request for LASA's three most recent annual PAIA reports to the Commission under section 32, it bears mentioning – because it brightly shows his contempt for the truth, for the law, and for my rights – that in a criminal contravention of section 90(1), Hundermark (or an officer acting in his name) altered one of these reports before providing it to me, by fraudulently adding

information that had been omitted from the true original submitted to the Commission, so as to confound my audit of the three reports for accuracy, having regard to LASA's history of false reporting described in my Special Report to the Commission, and to prevent me reporting that LASA has falsely reported under section 32 for the sixth time.

50. When I queried with Hundermark the forged report's anomalous page numbering, which had been affected by the information added to the criminally altered record he gave me, he compounded this crime by very characteristically mendaciously denying that any page was missing from the report.

51. Seeing as the Commission is not competent to investigate and prosecute the commission of 'Offences' set out in section 90, my complaint about this will be made to the South African Police Services and copied to the National Director of Public Prosecutions.

FORTH COMPLAINT

52. Hundermark refuses the whole of Part Three of my record request made to test the veracity, or more accurately to gather further evidence of the criminal mendacity, of Vedalankar's allegations to the Justice Portfolio Committee on 9 October 2012 that 'In terms of the discrepancy with the posts and employees, it was very clear in the report. They had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget.' (Had any of this been true, records would exist to support it; and my purpose was to force the production of an affidavit under section 23 certifying on oath that none of the specified records exist, to give to the police.)

53. The basis of Hundermark's blanket refusal to comply with Part Three of my request, which he copies and pastes to refuse all five records listed in this part, is identical, namely that:

The record is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the limited resources of Legal Aid SA.

54. Although in non-compliance with section 25(3)(a) Hundermark yet again fails to state the section he's relying on to refuse the request, it's clear from his second sentence that he means to rely on section 45, which uses basically the same language.

55. Considering his reference to my long ago finalised labour action (correctly dismissed inasmuch as my cause of action was totally misconceived, as I later found out via PAIA litigation), Hundermark appears to be alluding also to section 7, which section LASA has repeatedly raised against me since 2013 to justify refusing previous record requests I've made.

56. Clearly the specified records aren't 'similar' to 'the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11', i.e. the court record, so the contention is syntactical nonsense and can't and doesn't found a basis for refusing my request for them.

57. If Hundermark means that the requested records are in some manner similar to records adduced at the trial of the action to which he refers (they're not, quite the contrary; see below), such similarity would be irrelevant, and can't found a ground for refusing them as 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' under section 45, more especially because my contextual notes make plain that my purpose in requesting the records is exceptionally serious: I'm investigating and gathering evidence of a crime for prosecution.

58. In fact, the (non-existent) records I specified in Part Three are entirely *dissimilar* to any adduced at the trial of my labour claim. LASA's pleaded case

wasn't that 'they knew those posts couldn't be filled' despite the 'amount of funds ... allocated' to them, i.e. the 'amount of funds' for salaries for the posts budgeted by LASA and received from the Justice Department as Vedalankar told the Portfolio Committee, brazenly lying to it. (In truth and in fact, three eminently qualified and experienced candidates had been selected and recommended for the three remaining vacant Senior Litigator posts, so contrary to Vedalankar's blatant lies to the Committee about this, 'those posts could... [indeed have] be[en] filled' and 'they knew' it.) LASA's false defence to my claim to my appointment to the Pietermaritzburg post was completely different, namely that it hadn't received sufficient salary budget from the Department to fill the posts, and that's why they weren't filled – and not that for some unstated reason 'those posts couldn't be filled' despite the 'amount of funds ... allocated' to them .

59. In sum, LASA's successfully fraudulent case at trial in 2013 was totally opposite to Vedalankar's successfully fraudulent claims to the Portfolio Committee in 2012; and the radically contradictory lies told the Portfolio Committee and then the Labour Court are mutually destructive. (Only in 2016, years later, did it emerge from a record forced out of LASA by suing for it that the true reason the three still vacant, still budgeted, still funded Senior Litigator posts weren't filled with the candidates selected and recommended for them was top-level recruitment corruption and its cover-up – too much to explain here and anyway immaterial to this complaint.)

60. To the extent that Hundermark evidently believes my purpose in requesting the records to be different from my stated purpose (anyway irrelevant under section 11(3)(a) to the decision of my request) – which is to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution – he has unlawfully contravened section 11(3)(b).

61. In asserting his belief that my reason for requesting access is to use the records in future litigation as the basis of his decision to refuse my request, he's disregarded Dr Van der Berg's very correct 'advisory recommendations' that 'section 11(3)(a) and

(b) of the PAIA ... stipulates that a requester's right of access is not affected by the reasons for the request or the information officer's belief as to the requester's reasons for requesting access.'

62. Hundermark's claim that my record requests are 'ancillary' (= 'subordinate' or 'subservient', per the OED) to the labour litigation that he mentions is more sheer nonsense. Having been settled by final judgment long ago, my labour case is over, dead and buried.

63. The fact that a requested record might in some way be 'connected to' finalised legal proceedings, in an information officer's opinion, is no basis for calling the request, made for a serious stated purpose like collecting evidence of a crime, an obvious waste of time and unreasonably time-consuming to respond to.

64. Furthermore Hundermark well appreciates that my request for the records specified in Part Three of my request don't exist, so it can't be said that 'the work involved in processing the request would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the public body' as contemplated by section 45(b). To comply with Part Three of my request, all that's necessary is to depose to an affidavit under section 23 certifying that no records responsive to the specifications in this part exist.

65. In any event, section 46 over-rides section 45 in the circumstances. In my contextual notes I state that I'm collecting evidence of a crime. And there's no reason to doubt my earnest and my bona fides in announcing this project, because Hundermark knows I've commenced prosecuting LASA's delinquent top officers, starting with eight capital gross misconduct complaints made to the Judicial Service Commission against Board chairperson Mlambo JP (subsequently retired as head of LASA). The Society of Advocates of KwaZulu-Natal, to which I provided copies of my complaints, forwarded copies to LASA in turn. So Hundermark appreciates full well that I'm coming after LASA's rogue officers and that I'm determined to see them held to account.

66. Section 46, 'Mandatory disclosure in public interest', provides (my ellipsis for relevance) that 'the information officer of a public body must grant a request for access to a record of the body contemplated in section ... 45, if- (a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of- (i) a substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the law; ... and ... (b) the public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the harm contemplated in the provision in question.'

67. So even were my request for the records specified in Part Three hit by section 45, which it obviously isn't, section 46 requires that my records request be complied with anyway.

68. To the extent that Hundermark apparently means to rely on section 7 to justify refusing my request, as his language suggests – and since 2013 LASA has consistently relied on it to refuse my requests – the section has no relevance to an information officer's decision of PAIA request whatsoever. I deal with this at pages 7 and 8 of my letter to Dr Van der Berg.

69. As said, when it's eventually furnished to me – whether elicited with the Commission's assistance or ordered by court – I intend using LASA's section 23 affidavit, confirming that none of the records specified in Part Three of my request exist, in support of a criminal charge that Vedalankar lied to the Portfolio Committee on multiple counts, for which she should be sitting in a jail cell.

REDRESS EXPECTED

70. The 'redress' I expect the Commission to facilitate under section 184(2)(b) of the Constitution, in the exercise of its section 83(3)(d) power to 'recommend to a public or private body that the body make such changes in the manner in which it administers this Act as the Commission considers advisable', is that in regard to Hundermark's illegal and unconstitutional refusal of most of my PAIA request of 12 April 2019 the Commission do no more than confirm to LASA information officer Vedalankar that:

- 70.1. The information given the public in LASA's PAIA manual that the 'CLE' – i.e. the Chief Legal Executive, currently Hundermark – is a deputy information officer is wrong, in that Vedalankar hasn't designated him as a deputy information officer 'in writing' as section 17(6)(a) requires, and he holds no written delegation accordingly.
- 70.2. This wrong information in the PAIA manual is not the equivalent of the written delegation required by section 17(6)(a).
- 70.3. Not holding a written delegation by Vedalankar under section 17(6)(a), Hundermark is not a deputy information officer at LASA.
- 70.4. Because Hundermark is not a deputy information officer at LASA, his response to Brink's PAIA request was ipso facto ultra vires and unlawful.
- 70.5. In permitting Hundermark, who is not a deputy information officer, to respond to Brink's request, Vedalankar, as LASA's information officer ex officio under the definition of 'information officer' in section 1, unlawfully abdicated to him her 'power or duty conferred or imposed on that information officer by this Act' (in the language of per section 17(3)) to decide Brink's request.
- 70.6. Inasmuch as Brink duly emailed his request to Vedalankar on 12 April 2019, and, under section 25(1) read with section 4 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 defining 'days' in a statute, a response to it was due thirty calendar days later on 12 May, Hundermark's response on 16 May 2019 was out of time and unlawfully non-compliant with that section 25(1).
- 70.7. In failing to state what section of PAIA he was relying upon in refusing Brink access to counsels' fee-notes, specified in Part One, paragraph 1, of his request, Hundermark's refusal was non-compliant with section 25(3)(a).
- 70.8. Inasmuch as the Constitutional Court holds mere curiosity to be a sufficient lawful reason for requesting access to a public record, Hundermark's

justification for refusing Brink access to counsels' fee-notes, namely that his request for them is 'manifestly frivolous and vexatious', is baseless, and Hundermark's illegal and unconstitutional refusal violates Brink's fundamental right to information guaranteed by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.

- 70.9. Having regard to the definition of 'personal information' in section 1, Hundermark's categorisation of LASA's counsels' fee-notes as 'personal information' is false, and such invoices are accordingly not protected from disclosure by section 34 as he equally falsely implies by using this just-quoted phrase. Nor are they counsels' property in any sense recognised by PAIA. Upon submission to LASA for payment they became LASA's 'record[s]' as section 1 defines them, and must accordingly be disclosed to Brink in compliance with his request for them, duly made under section 18. Nor are the invoices records protected by sections 37 or 37, as alleged by LASA to justify refusing other fee-notes in the past.
- 70.10. Hundermark unlawfully failed to comply with section 25(3)(a) by not stating what section in Chapter 2, Part 4, of the Act, 'Grounds for Refusal of Records', he was relying on to refuse Brink's request for access to LASA's junior counsel's travel and subsistence vouchers, specified in paragraph 2 of Part One of the request.
- 70.11. Section 47 did not require junior counsel's consent to the release of the records; it requires an information officer to give notice to a third party where a requested record 'might be a record contemplated in section 34(1), 35(1), 36(1), 37(1) or 43(1)'.
- 70.12. The subsistence and travel vouchers reflecting junior counsel's expense are not protected by any of the just quoted sections, and must be disclosed to Brink in compliance with his duly made request for access to them under section 18.

- 70.13. In refusing Brink request for access to these cost records in relation to LASA's junior counsel's subsistence and travel expenses, Hundermark violated Brink's fundamental right to information guaranteed by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.
- 70.14. Hundermark's allegation that Brink's request in Part 1, paragraph 2, namely for access to vouchers reflecting LASA's in-house attorneys' subsistence and travel expenses, is 'manifestly frivolous and vexatious' is insupportable for the reason stated in paragraph 70.8 above; and Hundermark's further allegation that the request 'seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of Legal Aid SA' is transparently false, considering that in truth drawing the records from the case file, copying them and emailing them to Brink will consume no significant time at all.
- 70.15. Hundermark's further justification for refusing these subsistence and travel records, namely that Brink's 'request does not align to the prescripts and objectives of PAIA, namely to enable the requester to fully exercise his rights and protect such rights' irrelevantly and unlawfully confuses the requirement for access to private body records with that for access to public records. Whereas section 50, 'Right of access to records of private bodies' in Part 3, 'ACCESS TO RECORDS OF PRIVATE BODIES (ss 50-73)', 'CHAPTER 1 RIGHT OF ACCESS (s 50)', requires in subsection (1)(a) that the record requested must be 'required for the exercise or protection of any rights', there is no such requirement for entitlement to public body records, and under section 11 all the requester needs do to be entitled to access the records is comply with the formalities prescribed by section 18.
- 70.16. In refusing Brink access to these cost records in relation to LASA's in-house attorneys' travel and subsistence expenses, Hundermark has violated Brink's fundamental right to information guaranteed by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.

- 70.17. In failing to state the section on which he relies to refuse the records requested in Part Three of the request, concerning Vedalankar's allegations to the Justice Portfolio Committee on 9 October 2012 quoted in the request, Hundermark's refusal notice was unlawfully non-compliant with section 25(3)(a).
- 70.18. Hundermark's justification for refusing to grant access to all five records requested in Part Three, namely on the identical repeated basis that 'The record is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the limited resources of Legal Aid SA' is insupportable and unlawful, in that the requested records aren't 'similar, ancillary or connected' to the said long ago finalised action, either in fact or in any sense recognised by PAIA, and there's consequently no supportable basis for Hundermark's justification for refusing Brink's request, namely that it's an obvious and unreasonable waste of LASA's time to respond to it.
- 70.19. To the extent that Hundermark means to rely on section 7 to justify his refusal to comply with Part Three of Brink's request, the section has no application whatsoever to an information officer's decision of a PAIA request under any circumstances, and Hundermark's implicit reliance on this section to refuse this part of the request was incompetent, unlawful and unconstitutional.
- 70.20. To the extent that in making his decision to refuse Part Three of Brink's request, Hundermark relied on what he *believed* to be Brink's reason for requesting the records specified in it – different from Brink's *stated* reason, namely to collect evidence for Vedalankar's criminal prosecution – Hundermark unlawfully contravened section 11(3)(b).

70.21. To the extent that Hundermark believes that using PAIA to gather evidence for future (not pending) intended litigation is impermissible, and that such a request for records may be refused for this reason – contrary to the explicit lesson the Commission unsuccessfully gave LASA’s head office lawyers on the point at its training workshop held on 6 November 2011 – he is wrong; and his refusal of access to records requested for such further unstated reason (to use in future intended litigation) was illegal and unconstitutional.

70.22. Hundermark’s refusal of Brink’s request for the records specified in Part Three violated his fundamental right to information guaranteed by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution – in casu, to information in the form of an affidavit deposed to under section 23 certifying that the records specified in that part don’t exist, unless the specified records can be produced, in which event they must be.

FORM A

REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO RECORD OF PUBLIC BODY

(Section 18(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000))

[Regulation 2]

FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE

Reference number:

Request received by (state rank, name and surname of information officer/deputy information officer) on (date) at (place).

Request fee (if any): R

Deposit (if any): R

Access fee: R

SIGNATURE OF INFORMATION OFFICER/DEPUTY INFORMATION OFFICER

A. Particulars of public body

Legal Aid South Africa

29 De Beer Street

Braamfontein

Johannesburg

B. Particulars of person requesting access to the record

(a) *The particulars of the person who requests access to the record must be recorded below.*
 (b) *Furnish an address and/or fax number in the Republic to which information must be sent.*

Full names and surname : Anthony Robin Brink
 Identity number : 5902255116081
 Postal address : 36 Pearson Street, Eshowe 3815, KwaZulu-Natal
 Fax number : N/A
 Telephone number : 083 779 4174
 E-mail address : anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com

C. Particulars of person on whose behalf request is made:

N/A

D. Particulars of record

(a) Provide full particulars of the record to which access is requested, including the reference number if that is known to you, to enable the record to be located.

PART ONE

CONTEXTUAL NOTE:

On 15 March 2019, upon application made to the High Court at Pietermaritzburg, Legal Aid SA ('LASA') was granted an order postponing three opposed applications brought by the requester under section 78 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA') under case numbers 11187/16P; 14224/17P and 5239/18P to compel compliance with his requests for access to certain of LASA's public records, duly set down for argument on that day.

RECORDS REQUESTED:

- 1. All LASA's counsels' fee-notes for their services in drawing or settling the said postponement application papers, and for arguing the application.**
- 2. All travel expense and subsistence vouchers reflecting what LASA disbursed on travel and subsistence expenses for LASA's junior advocate and two in-house attorneys to attend the said postponement application.**

PART TWO

RECORDS REQUESTED:

- 3. LASA's annual reports made under section 32 of PAIA to the South African Human Rights Commission for:**
 - 3.1. 2016/17;**
 - 3.2. 2017/18;**
 - 3.3. 2018/19.**

PART THREE

CONTEXTUAL NOTE:

On 9 October 2012, at a meeting with the National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development (since renamed '-and Correctional Services'; hereafter 'the Committee'), LASA CEO Vidhu Vedalankar presented LASA's annual performance report for 2011/12.

The Committee had called the meeting in the exercise of its oversight responsibility over LASA imposed by section 55(2)(b)(ii) of the Constitution.

The Parliamentary Monitoring Group ('PMG') kept a minute of the meeting, a material excerpt of which follows:

Ms Vedalankar said that she could not comment on helping with Chapter 9 organisations because she would have to discuss it with her staff first. In terms of the discrepancy with the posts and employees, it was very clear in the report. They had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget.

Mr Jeffrey said that the expenditure could not be 99% with the figures that they had.

Ms Vedalankar said she would send the information to the Committee.

The PMG's minute records that Committee member Hon John Jeffery MP (now Justice Deputy Minister) had queried 'the discrepancy with the posts and employees', i.e. the discrepancy between reported budget expenditure and reported post occupancy, to which Vedalankar responded that 'it was very clear in the report. They [LASA's management executives] had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget.'

The minute reflects that Hon Jeffery didn't believe and accept this information given by Vedalankar to the Committee. To the contrary, 'Mr Jeffrey said that the expenditure could not be 99% with the [post occupancy] figures that they had.'

The minute further records that 'Ms Vedalankar said she would send the information to the Committee' – in addition to the 'very clear' information alleged to have been contained 'in the report' – to persuade Hon Jeffery, and to overcome his incredulity as to the truth of Vedalankar's information to the Committee that 'They had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget.'

RECORDS REQUESTED:

4. **Any record identifying what vacant ‘positions could not be filled’ at LASA that ‘they [Vedalankar and other LASA officers] knew’ about.**
5. **Any record reflecting the reason these vacant ‘positions could not be filled’ that ‘they knew’.**
6. **The record of executive management’s decision to ‘adjust.. the budget’ because ‘they knew that those positions could not be filled’.**
7. **The Board’s resolution to approve the ‘adjust[ment of] the budget’ because the vacant ‘positions could not be filled’, if, per LASA’s Approval Framework, this entailed a ‘Reallocation of budget in excess of 8% between cost centres’.**
8. **‘[T]he information’ about LASA’s ‘adjust[ment of] the budget’ (because ‘they knew that those positions could not be filled’) that Vedalankar sent the Committee after the meeting, as undertaken to Hon Jeffery; and its covering letter.**

CONTEXTUAL NOTE CONTINUED:

The reason Hon Jeffery clearly didn’t believe the said information Vedalankar gave the Committee may be because, inter alia, in truth and in fact ‘the report’ said nothing at all about LASA having ‘adjusted the budget’ – either for the reason Vedalankar alleged, namely that ‘they knew that those [unspecified vacant] positions could not be filled’ or for any other.

That is, Vedalankar’s statement to the Committee that ‘it was very clear in the report’ why there was a ‘discrepancy with the posts and employees’ was absolutely false.

Vedalankar didn’t specify to the Committee ‘those positions’ that ‘they knew ... could not be filled’.

Certainly she didn’t have in mind any of LASA’s public defender ‘positions’ serving the lower criminal courts, recruitment to which had briefly and temporarily been frozen by executive management with Board approval on 30 July 2010 for a couple of months until provision was made in the national mid-term budget in October 2010 for the payment of legal staff salary increases under the OSD scheme, because by October 2012 when

Vedalankar appeared before the Committee and claimed to it, 'They had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget', the hiccup over the delayed transfer of LASA's OSD budget for 2010/11 and the transient freeze on lower criminal public defender recruitment was distant history.

It seems likely that 'those positions' to which Vedalankar was alluding and implicitly claiming to the Committee 'could not be filled' (for some unstated reason 'they knew') were LASA's three remaining, very long vacant Senior Litigator posts at Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Mthatha at the top of its legal professional staff establishment, to which the requester had called both Hon Jeffery's and the Committee chairperson's attention.

Indeed, like Vedalankar's information to the Committee that 'those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget', LASA's annual report to the South African Human Rights Commission ('the Commission') under section 32 of PAIA for 2010/11 told a similar lie: 'the decision to freeze the [Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator] post due to change in business needs budget.'

In truth and in fact, as LASA National Operations Executive and deputy information officer Brian Nair repeatedly confirmed on affidavit in April 2011 and again in evidence in court in mid-2013, no record whatsoever exists of any such 'decision to freeze the post', as falsely and dishonestly alleged to the Commission for the intended misinformation of the Committee in turn.

And LASA's financial records show that there's been no 'change in business needs budget' concerning the Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post and those at Durban and Mthatha. Quite the contrary, since their creation by Board resolution in November 2006, LASA has applied and continues applying to the Justice Department every year, and has received and continues receiving millions of rands in salary funding for all nine of its Senior Litigator posts, including its three now very long vacant Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Mthatha posts.

And whereas in her total refusals in October 2010 and January 2011 of the requester's PAIA requests in August and December 2010 interrogating the reason the substantially complete recruitments to the said three posts had been aborted (off the record), Vedalankar repeatedly falsely alleged *insufficient budget* received from the Justice

Department as the reason for not proceeding to appoint the three candidates recommended by selection panels for LASA's three remaining vacant Senior Litigator posts and for freezing recruitment to them – which story she confirmed on affidavit under penalty of perjury in April 2011, as did Nair and Human Resources Executive Amanda Clark – Nair totally changed the alibi in his 'Report to Board' in November 2011 to account for why LASA's three remaining top professional posts had not been filled, after the *budgetary insufficiency* excuse had been completely discredited, and now falsely alleged '*recruitment challenges*', even as three eminently suitably qualified and experienced candidates had been selected and recommended for the posts – consistent with Vedalankar's absolutely false and untruthful claim to the Committee that 'they knew that those positions could not be filled'.

Hon Jeffery was pertinently aware of LASA's unlawful failure to finalize its successful, substantially complete recruitments to its Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Mthatha Senior Litigator posts under cover of a bogus financial insufficiency excuse eventually fed to the requester, and Vedalankar appreciated that Hon Jeffery was aware of this, because at her presentation on 11 October 2011 of LASA's annual report for 2010/11 the year before, Hon Jeffery pointedly raised the fact, reported to him by the requester, that LASA wasn't 'spending its money allocated to impact litigation'.

Which fact Chief Legal Executive Hundermark (then called 'Legal Development Executive'), also present at the meeting, conceded to the Committee, mentioning 'our senior litigators' performing this 'impact litigation', without disclosing to the Committee (i.e. concealing from it) that three Senior Litigator appointments had been illegally aborted and the three posts practically permanently frozen: wholly off the record in criminal contravention of section 55(1)(a) read with section 86(2) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 ('PFMA') (quoted below); unlawfully without Board authority under the Approval Framework (quoted below); and unlawfully under section 53(4) of the PFMA (quoted below) – as the Constitutional Court confirmed in *Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others* (CCT136/17) [2018] ZACC 1 (22 January 2018): in the case of public entities, 'leaving' a budgeted and funded 'position' 'vacant' is a 'breach of the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)'.

Section 55(1)(a) of the PFMA requires that 'The accounting authority for a public entity ... must keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the public entity'. Not to do so is a serious crime under section 86(2): 'An accounting authority is guilty of an

offence and liable on conviction to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, if that accounting authority wilfully or in a grossly negligent way fails to comply with a provision of section ... 55.'

So if Vedalankar told the Committee the truth when responding to Hon Jeffery's query about 'the discrepancy with the posts and employees', by stating that she and her management colleagues 'had allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget', records will exist to vouch that they had indeed 'adjusted' LASA's salary 'budget' sought from the National Treasury, voted by the National Assembly, and paid over via the Justice Department's Third Party Funds Division during or before the 2011/12 financial year (because 'they knew that those positions could not be filled').

And records will exist to show that that 'they adjusted the budget' by reallocating to other cost centres the salary 'budget' applied for and received for 'those positions' that 'they knew ... could not be filled'.

Certainly LASA's 'budget' has never been 'adjusted' downwards in regard to its three Senior Litigator 'positions' that 'they' allegedly 'knew ... could not be filled', because LASA's annual budget records reveal that it has always budgeted for and has always received salary budget from the Treasury via the Justice Department for all nine of its Senior Litigator posts, including its three now very long vacant posts at Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Mthatha. And it continues to do so.

Section 2.3 of LASA's Approval Framework governing 'Reallocation of budget – Operational expenditure' prescribes different levels of executive approval required for the reallocation of different amounts of LASA's budget, and it requires Board approval for any 'Reallocation of budget in excess of 8% between cost centres'.

So if Vedalankar and her fellow management executives 'adjusted' LASA's salary 'budget', not by lowering it (because they never did) but by reallocating part of it, and this entailed a 'Reallocation of budget in excess of 8% between cost centres', a record will exist to vouch that the Board approved this – unless she and they 'adjusted' LASA's salary 'budget' in regard to 'those positions' that 'they knew ... could not be filled' by reallocating 33.3% of it (one third of the salary budget for the nine Senior Litigator posts – three vacant) without Board approval in an unlawful contravention of section 2.3 of LASA's Approval Framework.

Section 53(4) of the PFMA prescribes: ‘The accounting authority for such a public entity is responsible for ensuring that expenditure of that public entity is in accordance with the approved budget.’

By definition under section 1, the Board is LASA’s ‘accounting authority’; and as authorised to do so by section 56(1)(a), the Board has delegated its powers as such to Vedalankar.

Under section 56(2)(c), the Board retains ultimate ‘responsibility concerning the exercise of the delegated power or the performance of the assigned duty’ as ‘accounting authority’, of which ‘responsibility’ its delegation to Vedalankar doesn’t ‘divest’ it.

Consistently with section 56(1)(a) of the PFMA, section 16 of the Legal Aid South Africa Act 39 of 2014 stipulates under the heading ‘Functions of chief executive officer’ in subsection (2): ‘Subject to the provisions of section 56 of the Public Finance Management Act, the chief executive officer has such powers and duties as may, in writing, be delegated or assigned to him or her by the Board.’

At the trial of case DLC 529/11 in mid-2013, a copy of the Board’s delegation to Vedalankar of its ‘powers and duties’ as ‘accounting authority’ was handed into court by LASA’s counsel.

If the requested records specified in this Part don’t exist, section 23 of PAIA requires that this be certified on affidavit – categorically and unambiguously: Section 23(1)(b) draws a clear and crucial distinction between a record that ‘(i) is in the public body’s possession but cannot be found’ and one that ‘(ii) does not exist’.

The two categories are distinguished by ‘or’, so an affidavit complying with section 23 may not conflate non-existent records with extant but lost records.

Subsection (2) prescribes: ‘The affidavit or affirmation referred to in subsection (1) must give a full account of all steps taken to find the record in question or to determine whether the record exists, as the case may be, including all communications with every person who conducted the search on behalf of the information officer.’

Albeit irrelevant under section 11(3) of PAIA to the decision of the request, the requester records that his reason for requesting the records specified in this Part is to establish whether Vedalankar told the Committee the truth in responding to Hon Jeffery’s query about ‘the discrepancy with the posts and employees’ when she stated, ‘They had

allocated a certain amount of funds but they knew that those positions could not be filled so they adjusted the budget' (certainly untruthfully false was her statement that 'In terms of the discrepancy with the posts and employees, it was very clear in the report'), or whether, as Hon Jeffery suggested, she lied to the Committee in making this statement – in furtherance of a cover-up of top-level recruitment corruption entailing multiple criminal and other illegal contraventions of the PFMA (illustrating the adage coined after Watergate: 'The cover-up is always worse than the crime') to defeat the Committee's constitutional oversight mandate over LASA and to evade detection and being held to account – in criminal contravention of section 17(2)(e) of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004.

Which provides: 'A person who ... wilfully furnishes a House or committee with information, or makes a statement before it, which is false or misleading ... commits an offence and is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both the fine and imprisonment.' In which case, the requester intends referring the matter to the Committee and to the National Director of Public Prosecutions.

E. Fees

*(a) A request for access to a record, other than a record containing personal information about yourself, will be processed only after a **request fee** has been paid. (b) You will be notified of the amount required to be paid as the request fee. (c) The **fee payable for access** to a record depends on the form in which access is required and the reasonable time required to search for and prepare a record.*

The R35 request fee prescribed by section 22 of PAIA was paid into Legal Aid SA's bank account on even date under reference number: PAIA_Brink_2019.

F. Form of access to record

Mark the appropriate box with an "X".

(a) Your indication as to the required form of access depends on the form in which the record is available.

(b) Access in the form requested may be refused in certain circumstances. In such a case you will be informed if access will be granted in another form.

(c) The fee payable for access to the record, if any, will be determined partly by the form in which access is requested.

1. If the record is in written or printed form -

X	copies of records		inspection of record
---	-------------------	--	----------------------

2. If record consists of visual images - N/A						
3. If record consists of recorded words or information which can be reproduced in sound - N/A						
4. If record is held on computer or in an electronic form -						
<input type="checkbox"/>	printed copy of record	<input type="checkbox"/>	printed copy of information derived from the record*	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	X	copies in computer readable form – to be emailed as file attachments.

G. Notice of decision regarding request for access

You will be notified in writing whether your request has been approved/denied. If you wish to be informed thereof in another manner, please specify the manner and provide the necessary particulars to enable compliance with your request.

How would you prefer to be informed of the decision regarding your request for access to the record?

By email.

Signed at Eshowe on 12 April 2019



SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER



Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>



PAIA request

1 message

Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
To: vidhuv <vidhuv@legal-aid.co.za>

12 April 2019 at 14:33

Vidhu Vedalankar
CEO and information officer
Legal Aid SA

Dear Ms Vedalankar

I attach a request made under section 18 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA') for access to certain records, as well as an evenly dated letter addressed to the head of the South African Human Rights Commission's PAIA Unit, copied widely, in which I ask the Commission to exercise its section 83(3) powers to monitor your handling of my request; to assist me in achieving compliance with it; and to guide you in responding to it properly.

Before responding to my request, I recommend you study my letter carefully.

Yours sincerely

ADV ANTHONY BRINK

2 attachments**1.SAHRC 12 April 2019.pdf**
167K**2.LASA PAIA request 12 April 2019.pdf**
122K

36 Pearson Road
Eshowe, KwaZulu-Natal
12 April 2019

EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT

Dr Shanelle van der Berg
PAIA Unit Director and Deputy Information Officer
South African Human Rights Commission
33 Hoofd Street, Braampark Forum 3, Braamfontein, Johannesburg
Private Bag X2700, Houghton 2041

Cc:

Hon John Jeffery MP, Deputy Minister of the Department of Justice and
Correctional Services: Private Bag X395, Pretoria 0001

Hon Madipoane Mothapo MP, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Justice
and Correctional Services, National Assembly: PO Box 15, Cape Town 8000

Adv Pansy Tlakula, Information Regulator: Private Bag X81, Pretoria 0001

Nobukhosi Zulu, Coordinator of the Freedom of Information Programme,
South African History Archive: PO Box 31719, Braamfontein 2017

Gabriella Razzano, Executive Director of the Open Democracy Advice Centre:
1 Scott Road, Observatory, Cape Town 7925

Mark Weinberg, National Coordinator of The Right2Know Campaign:
107 Community House, 41 Salt River Rd, Salt River, Cape Town 7925

David Lewis, Director of Corruption Watch: PO Box 30630, Braamfontein 2017

Nicole Fritz, CEO of Freedom Under Law: PO Box 1972, Somerset West 7129

Francis Antonie, Director of the Helen Suzman Foundation: Postnet Suite 130,
Private Bag X2600, Houghton 2041

Lawson Naidoo, Director of the Council for the Advancement of the Constitution:
PO Box 679, Rondebosch 7700

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Professor Alan A. Paterson, Chairperson of the International Legal Aid Group. By email: prof.alan.paterson@strath.ac.uk

Heads of Department, Constitutional Law, South African universities

Hon Dunstan Mlambo JP, Chairperson of the Board of Legal Aid South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Private Bag X7, Johannesburg 2000

Vidhu Vedalankar, CEO and information officer, Legal Aid South Africa: By email: vidhuv@legal-aid.co.za

And to media and other interested parties

Dear Dr Van der Berg

AN APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE IN
ACCESSING PUBLIC RECORDS HELD BY LEGAL AID SA
AFTER A DECADE OF PERSISTENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PAIA
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF TOP-LEVEL CORRUPTION
AND OTHER GROSS MALFEASANCE

Concerned that after apartheid we make a radical break in our open democracy from the former regime's 'secretive and unresponsive culture in public ... bodies which often led to an abuse of power and human rights violations', as the

Preamble of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 ('PAIA' or 'the Act') balefully reminds us, the National Assembly ('NA') specifically empowered the South African Human Rights Commission ('the Commission') under section 83(3) of the Act, inter alia, to:

- (b) monitor the implementation of this Act;
- (c) if reasonably possible, on request, assist any person wishing to exercise a right contemplated in this Act;
- (d) recommend to a public or private body that the body make such changes in the manner in which it administers this Act as the Commission considers advisable;
- (e) train information officers and deputy information officers of public bodies[.]

I write to request that the Commission exercise these special powers to see to Legal Aid South Africa's ('LASA's) compliance at last with my fundamental civil right to public information entrenched by section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution – 'Everyone has the right of access to ... any information held by the state' – and given effect by PAIA¹ – by allowing me access to certain of its records that I've duly requested under section 18 of the Act, or, where they don't exist, by certifying this on oath under section 23.

Annexed is a copy of my PAIA request of even date made in the form prescribed by section 18(2) and proof of delivery to LASA's CEO and information officer Vidhu Vedalankar by email, as permitted by section 18(1).

Since 2010, LASA has consistently and repeatedly refused virtually all PAIA requests I've made in my investigation of recruitment corruption and other gross malfeasance in the organisation, including ongoing illegal contraventions of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 ('PFMA') running into many millions

¹ Section 9: 'The objects of this Act are– (a) to give effect to the constitutional right of access to–(i) any information held by the State'. Very pertinently to my matter, Open Democracy Advice Centre Executive Director Gabriella Razzano stated in her presentation to the Fourth National Anti-Corruption Forum Summit in Cape Town, 8–9 December 2011: 'Access to information is a fundamental tool in the fight against corruption.'

of rands annually, to the detriment of expert legal professional service delivery to the indigent in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, and, to cover this up, the commission of such crimes as perjury and lying and false reporting to mislead the NA's Justice Portfolio Committee.

To claw out of LASA the records needed for this corruption investigation, determinedly refused every time on obviously incompetent shifting grounds – frankly conceded to the Commission in October 2011 and abandoned in court at the point of argument in February 2016 – I've repeatedly had to sue for them: nine court applications to date, including an application to compel full and proper performance under a settlement agreement (surrender treaty) that LASA made with me after totally capitulating at court to my first five applications, reversing itself after years of delay, and undertaking to finally turn over all the records I'd duly requested and for which I'd had to sue, or to certify under section 23 those that don't exist.

In persistently refusing to make its records available to me upon duly made request, unless forced to do so by litigation, LASA has traduced the point 'emphasize[d]' by the Supreme Court of Appeal ('SCA') in *Claase v Information Officer of South African Airways* [2006] SCA 163 (RSA):

Section 9 of the Act states that one of the objects of the Act is:

'(d) to establish voluntary and mandatory mechanisms or procedures to give effect to that right in a manner which enables persons to obtain access to records of public and private bodies as swiftly, inexpensively and effortlessly as reasonably possible;'

I emphasize the words 'swiftly' and 'effortlessly'.

The staggering history of LASA's demonstrated contempt for its constitutional information transparency obligations in obstructing my corruption investigation, so as to hinder my exposure and reporting of the above-mentioned gross malfeasance, including criminal misconduct, and the repeated litigation to which I've been constrained to resort to surmount it, delayed by meritless, ultimately abandoned defences mounted to hinder it; LASA's repeated false annual

reporting to the Commission under section 32 to misinform the Commission's section 84 reports to the NA and thereby conceal from the NA its illegal and unconstitutional suppression of public records, so as to frustrate and defeat the NA's constitutional oversight responsibility over LASA under section 55(2)(b)(ii) of the Constitution and evade being held to account; LASA board chairperson Dunstan Mlambo JP's perversion, with deliberately false information, of separate, independent ministerial and parliamentary enquiries in 2011, instituted at my instance, inter alia into Vedalankar's repeated illegal and unconstitutional refusals to comply with my first two PAIA requests in 2010 on patently spurious grounds, later abandoned; the Commission's repeated unsuccessful interventions to get LASA to start complying with the Act, including holding a special urgently conducted PAIA training workshop for its national office lawyers in how to respond lawfully and constitutionally in future to PAIA requests for access to its records, and reporting LASA's repeated non-compliance in its section 84 report to the NA; and Vedalankar's perversion, with deliberately false information, of the Justice Portfolio Committee's enquiries into the matter at a meeting with her, arising from the Commission's said report – all this is detailed in a comprehensive memorandum I submitted to the Commission in late 2016, entitled: 'SPECIAL REPORT ON LEGAL AID SA: AN AGGRAVATED CASE OF REPEATED WILFUL NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 2 OF 2000 TO ILLEGALLY OBSTRUCT ACCESS TO DULY REQUESTED RECORDS, AND REPEATED FALSE ANNUAL AND "CONFIDENTIAL" REPORTING TO CONCEAL THIS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'.²

² The Special Report is accessible online at <https://goo.gl/Ut9eH5>. It's to be greatly regretted that it lies unattended in the Commission's office files instead of being brought to the Portfolio Committee's attention under section 84 to enable it to exercise its constitutional oversight mandate over LASA and to hold it to account – with the result that the Committee remains unaware of LASA's ongoing repeated PAIA delinquency over the past decade, and has been repeatedly misled by the Commission's section 84 reports into believing that, besides twice falsely reporting to the Commission under section 32 in 2011 and 2012, LASA has otherwise duly complied with its information transparency obligations, when the opposite has been true, in undoubtedly the most egregious case of persistent, corruptly motivated non-compliance with PAIA in the history of our democracy.

Three subsequent applications³ that I had to bring in the High Court at Pietermaritzburg in 2016, 2017 and 2018 under section 78 of PAIA to compel LASA's compliance with duly made record requests in those years were set down for argument on 15 March 2019, but were postponed on the novel basis, hitherto unrecognised and indeed repeatedly rejected by other Divisions, that LASA's advocates who'd drawn its answering papers were busy elsewhere with other cases that day, and that it would be cheaper to keep them in the case than to brief other counsel to argue.

Interested⁴ in ascertaining the total cost of the postponement application in legal fees and disbursements, my instant request seeks all counsels' fee-notes for their services in drawing the papers and arguing it, and all travel expense vouchers.

I've also requested LASA's section 32 reports to the Commission for 2016/17, 2017/18 and 2018/19 to check their accuracy, seeing as by April 2016 LASA had falsely and deceptively reported to the Commission *five times*⁵ to conceal its illegal and unconstitutional non-compliance with my several PAIA requests. And since the Commission mentioned in its section 84 report to the NA for 2015/16 that it hasn't the resources to audit the integrity of such reports, I intend to audit LASA's latest three, as I did its previous ones.

More importantly, I've requested some records to test the veracity of certain allegations Vedalankar made to the Justice Portfolio Committee at its meeting with her in October 2012, quoted in my request, which the Committee member challenging them clearly didn't believe, and which, for a complex of reasons not relevant to detail here, including their corrupt motivation, I'm certain were untrue⁶ – and, if indeed they prove to have been untrue, will form the basis of

³ The papers are accessible online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.

⁴ The Constitutional Court noted in *Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission* [2018] ZACC (24 April 2018) (*HSF*) that 'PAIA affords any person the right of access to any information held by the state.⁵⁰ The person seeking the information need not give any explanation whatsoever as to why she or he requires the information. The person could be the classic busybody who wants access to information held by the state for the sake of it.' Footnote 50 of the judgment references 'Section 9(a)(i) of PAIA'.

⁵ Detailed in the Special Report, also online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.

⁶ Vedalankar made other untruthful, deliberately misleading allegations at the meeting, canvassed in paragraphs 148–67 of the Special Report, in which she (i) falsely justified with outright lies the illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my first three PAIA requests in 2010 and 2011 ('the unlawfulness' of which the Commission had confirmed in its correspondence with me),

criminal complaints I intend making against her under section 17(2)(e) of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 2004⁷ and under section 86(2) of the PFMA.⁸

Since 2013, LASA has consistently been raising sections 7 and 45 of PAIA against me to refuse virtually all my PAIA requests made for similar serious purposes: namely to expose perjury committed in legal proceedings; criminal lies told to mislead the Portfolio Committee; pervasive systemic corruption of recruitment operations at LASA, both procedural and ethical; and the abuse of public funds⁹ on meritless litigation directed at preventing my access to its duly requested records – including records pledged in court just before argument, under pressure of imminent orders compelling their surrender and declaring that LASA’s deputy information officers had violated the Constitution in refusing them.

As the Commission’s deputy information officer and head of its PAIA Unit, you’ll appreciate instantly that section 7 has no relevance and application whatsoever to the decision of a PAIA request, and doesn’t afford an information officer a ground for refusing it under any circumstances.¹⁰ Yet to block my access to its

and (ii) falsely repudiated as ‘untrue’ the Commission’s section 84 report concerning LASA’s repeated false reporting to it under section 32 – which false repudiation by Vedalankar the Commission’s PAIA expert Dr Fola Adeleke refuted when asked about it at the Committee’s meeting with the Commission two months later in December 2012: ‘Mr Adeleke answered the question of the LASA disputing the SAHRC’s report. LASA could not dispute the finding because the Commission had shown [etc].’ These other untruthful, deliberately misleading allegations Vedalankar made to the Committee about LASA’s non-compliance with PAIA will also found criminal complaints under section 17(2)(e) of Act 4 of 2004.

⁷ ‘A person who ... wilfully furnishes a House or committee with information, or makes a statement before it, which is false or misleading ... commits an offence and is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both the fine and imprisonment.’

⁸ ‘An accounting authority is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, if that accounting authority wilfully or in a grossly negligent way fails to comply with a provision of section ... 55.’ Section 55(1)(a) requires: ‘The accounting authority for a public entity ... must keep full and proper records of the financial affairs of the public entity’. Chaired by Mlambo JP, the Board is LASA’s ‘accounting authority’ by definition under section 1; and under section 56(1)(a) the Board has delegated its powers as such to Vedalankar.

⁹ Section 83(1)(b) of the PFMA prohibits ‘an irregular expenditure or a fruitless and wasteful expenditure’ by a public entity like LASA, and recoverable personally from the delinquent officers responsible under the Treasury’s May 2014 ‘Guideline on Fruitless and Wasteful Expenditure’.

¹⁰ Section 7, headed ‘Act not applying to records requested for criminal or civil proceedings after commencement of proceedings’, provides:

- (1) This Act does not apply to a record of a public body or a private body if-
 - (a) that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings;

records and to suppress evidence of the most serious malfeasance, including criminal misconduct, LASA has spuriously raised it against me every time.

And a request for records sought for the extraordinarily serious purposes mentioned above – the genuineness of which LASA has never disputed, and which it's well aware I've commenced acting on¹¹ – can hardly be 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' on any bona fide assessment. Yet section 45, which disallows obviously time-wasting requests, is raised to refuse my every request. That is, my clearly serious requests are abusively called 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' to totally block my access to LASA's records every time.¹²

To justify refusing me access to LASA's counsels' fee-notes for their services in meritless defensive litigation in the Magistrate's Court (abandoned in court at the point of argument) and then meritless aggressive litigation in the High Court (quickly dismissed)¹³ to prevent me enforcing the settlement agreement LASA

(b) so requested after the commencement of such criminal or civil proceedings, as the case may be; and

(c) the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred to in paragraph (a) is provided for in any other law.

(2) Any record obtained in a manner that contravenes subsection (1) is not admissible as evidence in the criminal or civil proceedings referred to in that subsection unless the exclusion of such record by the court in question would, in its opinion, be detrimental to the interests of justice.

¹¹ Commencing to deal with the gross malfeasance I've found at the very top of the organisation, I filed eight gross misconduct complaints to the Judicial Service Commission ('JSC') against LASA Board chairperson Mlambo JP in mid-2017, most of which concern his documented complicity in and connivance at Vedalankar's illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my early PAIA requests and his covering this up with false reporting to the Minister and Portfolio Committee to successfully pervert their special enquiries into it. Satisfied that my charges against him are substantial and answerable, the JSC's Judicial Conduct Committee required him to respond – which he did evidently unconvincingly and unsatisfactorily, because in a telephone call to me on 11 February 2019, JSC secretary Lynette Bios informed me that the Committee had resolved to institute disciplinary proceedings. The Society of Advocates of KwaZulu-Natal briefed LASA with copies of my eight complaints, being my complete answer to its charge laid in November 2015, of which I chanced to learn in April 2017, that as an advocate I'd professionally disgracefully impugned Mlambo JP's integrity as a sitting judge. My complaints to the JSC, effectively dispositive of LASA's complaint against me, were put up in a supplementary affidavit I made in Pietermaritzburg High Court case 12124/16P and are consequently part of the public court record. They're also accessible online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.

¹² In his evidence given to the Zondo Commission on State Capture on 11 April 2019, former Independent Police Investigations Directorate head Robert McBride described similar routine spurious categorization of ordinary police records as 'classified' to obstruct his unit's access to them and its investigation of serious malfeasance and corruption in the South African Police Services.

¹³ In the style of BOSASA interdicting the Special Investigations Unit to block its corruption investigation, LASA tried interdicting me from (i) enforcing the settlement agreement it had dishonoured by not delivering all pledged records and duly certifying under section 23 those that

made with me in the Magistrate's Court to turn over all requested records for which I'd sued, or duly certify those that don't exist, and to respond to a final PAIA request in the matter of LASA's Senior Litigator posts,¹⁴ LASA has also raised sections 34, 36 and 37 against me to conceal the vast wasted cost of this corruptly driven litigation to obstruct my access to its records, which irregular fruitless and wasteful expenditure I've stated I intend reporting to the Auditor General.

To read with any intelligence sections '34 Mandatory protection of privacy of third party who is natural person'; '36 Mandatory protection of commercial information of third party' and '37 Mandatory protection of certain confidential information, and protection of certain other confidential information, of third party' is to appreciate at a glance that they have no relevance and application at all to such ordinary statements of account by LASA's advocates for payment of their legal fees.

Indeed, LASA had no compunction about giving me its counsels' fee-notes in the past, when it wanted me to pay them,¹⁵ and didn't then pretend that they were

don't exist; (ii) from making any more PAIA requests; and (iii) from again suing to compel the delivery of requested records illegally and unconstitutionally denied me, by applying to have me declared a vexatious litigant; but the Pietermaritzburg High Court found LASA's case so manifestly meritless both in law and on the facts that it dismissed it without even calling on to argue. My answering papers and heads of argument are online via the just-mentioned hyperlink. Some of the recruitment corruption I've uncovered at LASA is detailed in my answering affidavit.¹⁴ In an illegal contravention of section 53(4) of the PFMA, three of these posts have been deliberately left vacant for nearly a decade, in an ongoing cover-up of top level recruitment corruption. The Constitutional Court confirmed in *Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others* (CCT136/17) [2018] ZACC 1 (22 January 2018) that 'leaving' a budgeted and funded 'position' in an organ of state 'vacant' is a 'breach of the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)'. Nine Senior Litigator posts were created by resolution of the Board on 24 November 2006, with the object, according to executive management's motivation for them, of 'Increasing Senior Litigation capacity' to remedy the respondent's lack of 'professional staff that are senior enough to take on ... cases of a highly complex nature': 'It is proposed that we build up such capacity at each province linked to a high court unit. Such senior litigators would be able to undertake more complex work as well as support and mentor our other High Court staff. (The Justice Portfolio Committee repeatedly expressed its concern about this professional deficit.) Three of these funded and budgeted critical posts at LASA have been unfilled for twelve-and-a-half years, during which the indigent in KwaZulu-Natal have been deprived of complex in-house litigation services.

¹⁵ Misdirected by LASA's persistent, repeated illegal suppression of a pivotal record that I'd duly requested under PAIA, I lost a case in the Labour Court, having sued on the wrong cause of action: unfair discrimination instead of everyday recruitment corruption in the form of old-boy-network, jobs-for-pals cronyism, revealed by the said key record eventually released years later, after I'd sued for it – and got condemned in costs, wrongly, the Constitutional Court observed in *Zungu*: "The correct approach in labour matters in terms of the LRA is that the losing party is not

‘confidential, private and proprietary information relating to third parties’, as it later stupidly claimed to justify hiding other such invoices from me, and ultimately from the Auditor General.

LASA’s persistent invocation of all these irrelevant and inapplicable sections to falsely and insupportably justify refusing me access to its duly requested public records can only be described, in the language of the SCA in *Clause*, as ‘intentionally vexatious’, and an illustration of the South African History Archive’s (‘SAHA’s’) Freedom of Information Programme’s observation in its recent review on 8 January 2019, ‘Challenges to Full Realisation of PAIA’:

Non-disclosure of information held by the State ... as well as enforced secrecy were at the centre of the anti-democratic character of the apartheid system ... It is unfortunate that in the post apartheid era, information continues to be withheld from the public ... Our experience is that not many people receive training or are informed about this piece of legislation and it is no surprise then that its implementation is extremely low.

And by LASA almost zero.

Considering the history of LASA’s repeated illegal and unconstitutional refusals to comply with my PAIA requests and its determined and persistent suppression of records I’ve sought,¹⁶ I’m expecting my instant request to be illegally and unconstitutionally refused in the usual routine again, with sections 7 and 45 raised against me generally, and specifically to justify concealing its counsels’ fee-notes, sections 34, 36 and 37 as well.

And there’s little doubt about this inevitability, because in refusing my last PAIA request for certain financial information (addressed to the Justice Department, but transferred to LASA under section 20), LASA Chief Legal Executive Patrick

as a norm ordered to pay the successful party’s costs. ... The rule of practice that costs follow the result does not apply in Labour Court matters’, and again in *Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd and Others* [2018] ZACC 7, citing *Zungu*: ‘It is well accepted that in labour matters, the general principle that costs follow the result does not apply.’

¹⁶ Like the Free State provincial administration’s persistent withholding of records requested by former Free State economic development MEC Mxolisi Dukoana, needed to support his evidence to the Zondo Commission on state capture and former premier Ace Magashule’s involvement in it.

Hundermark told me on 2 March 2018 that any ‘future requests will be dealt with similarly’, namely ‘in terms of section 7 [and] section 45 of PAIA’.

Hoping to forestall yet another illegal and unconstitutional refusal of my instant request on all these fatuous grounds and to obviate the necessity of making yet another application to the High Court to compel LASA’s compliance with it, I write, as mentioned at the beginning, to request that the Commission exercise its section 83(3) powers to:

- ‘*monitor*’ under subsection (b) LASA’s response to my request, and to see to it that in doing so it ‘*implement[s] this Act*’ properly, lawfully and constitutionally, thereby respecting my fundamental right to access its public records;
- ‘*assist*’ me under subsection (c) to exercise my said constitutional ‘*right contemplated in this Act*’ to access the requested records, in the wholly predictable event that LASA again refuses my request, contemptuous of its constitutional information obligations in the democratic era when covering up gross malfeasance and criminality in its top ranks by illegally suppressing further evidence of it;
- ‘*recommend*’ under subsection (d), in the inevitable event of another illegal and unconstitutional refusal, that LASA ‘*changes ... the manner in which it administers the Act as the Commission considers advisable*’, and more specifically that it quit very obviously misapplying sections 7, 34, 36, 37 and 45 of PAIA to my requests to incompetently, illegally and unconstitutionally justify concealing from me duly requested records that I’ve stated I intend referring to the authorities; and,
- ‘*train*’ LASA’s information- and deputy information officers under subsection (d) in how to respond lawfully and constitutionally to PAIA requests by simply confirming to them the following rudimentary principles of the Act:

1. Section 7 has no relevance and application whatsoever to the decision of a PAIA request; doesn’t afford an information officer a ground for

refusing it, not being one of the grounds specified in the closed list permitted by Chapter 4 of Part 2 of the Act, 'Grounds for Refusal of Access to Records'; and can't therefore be lawfully relied on to refuse it. And to invoke section 7 to refuse my instant request will be grossly ignorant, incompetent, illegal, and unconstitutional. And, in the language of the SCA in *Clase*, 'intentionally vexatious'.

2. A PAIA request made for such gravely serious purposes as testing the veracity of allegations made to the Justice Portfolio Committee – which, if shown to be lies, could see its author jailed – obviously can't honestly be dismissed as 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' as envisaged by section 45. Quite the contrary, such a request is manifestly extremely serious; and should LASA refuse my instant request in its usual routine by calling it 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious', this will be clearly dishonest, incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

3. The fact that a requester has repeatedly tried accessing a public body's records for various different serious reasons over a decade, with virtually all his requests illegally and unconstitutionally refused, only to be surrendered under pressure of repeated litigation,¹⁷ doesn't ipso facto render a subsequent request such as the instant one, also made for the most serious stated reasons, 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' under section 45.

In striking contradistinction to the relatively tiny number of PAIA requests I've made since 2010 for access to an equally relatively tiny number of records, the High Court recorded in *Mandag Centre for Investigative Journalism and another v Minister of Public Works and another* (67574/12) [2014] ZAGPPHC 226 (29 April 2014) that since its

¹⁷ To wit, round after round of interlocutory discovery procedure in the Labour Court to extract determinedly withheld documents originally requested under PAIA but refused, and then five applications under section 78 to the Eshwe Magistrate's Court, all conceded at court before argument, and then a sixth application to compel full and proper compliance with the settlement agreement, which disgorged more records that had been promised in the agreement but withheld in breach of it. Three applications are currently pending in the High Court, opposing which – to game the system and obstruct my access to its records for as long as possible with all the virtually limitless resources of the state at its disposal – LASA is relying on exactly the same spurious justifications to block my requests that it abandoned in the Magistrate's Court.

formation in 2011, SAHA had made ‘over 1800 requests for information from predominantly government departments’ and ‘numerous applications in the High Court’.

In its investigation of the Inkandla scandal, the Mail & Guardian newspaper (‘M&G’) successfully applied to court in the above cited case to compel the delivery of further records over and above ‘the tendered documents in excess of 12000, copies of which were provided to the applicants’, as the court put it in the said judgment, rejecting the information officer’s contention that this ‘crossed “the line between a legitimate request in terms of PAIA and abuse of the Act.”’

In short, the number of requests I’ve made over the past decade and the number of records to which I’ve sought access is miniscule compared with SAHA’s and the M&G’s, and doesn’t make my instant request ‘manifestly frivolous or vexatious’ under section 45, as LASA has persistently alleged to falsely justify its total refusals of my previous requests. And LASA’s refusal of my instant request as ‘manifestly frivolous or vexatious’, because it follows a number of requests made in the past, nearly all refused, will be insupportable in light of the above-mentioned precedents of very numerous PAIA requests for very numerous records that the High Court has approved, and it will be incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

4. Using PAIA to gather documentary evidence for use in future, intended litigation – such as a proposed rescission application to be brought under common law, based on newly surfaced documents obtained with PAIA after trial and judgment, proving that sworn evidence on which a court relied was perjured, which is to say the court was defrauded, prior to which the Justice Portfolio Committee was also blatantly lied to in the matter – is an entirely perfectly proper use of the Act, as the Commission tried teaching LASA at the special PAIA training workshop it held for it on 6 October 2011 unsuccessfully:

The Introduction to the Commission's report of the workshop records that a key point on which LASA was instructed was the legal and constitutional imperative that requesters like me 'who are wishing to litigate on the basis of PAIA are responded to on the same basis as other [requesters]'.

The Commission's special necessary tuition on the point for LASA's head office lawyers failed. LASA's persistent line following the Commission's evidently fruitless seminar has been that my PAIA requests have been improper and disallowable under section 45 as an obvious waste of its time because some of them have been made with the intention of using records I've sought in future litigation, namely an intended rescission application based on fraud; and because, in LASA's head office lawyers' opinion, dismally ignorant of the ancient, well-settled remedy available to litigants defeated by perjury, such a rescission application is 'impermissible'.

Should LASA raise section 45 against me to refuse my instant request as 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' on the basis that I'm gathering documentary evidence for use in future, intended litigation, its reliance on the section to do so will be grossly ignorant, incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

5. A fee-note/invoice/statement of account presented by an advocate to an instructing public law firm like LASA, an organ of state, for payment for his professional services:

(a) is a 'record' under the 'Definitions' in section 1 of PAIA and therefore accessible to the public under section 11, upon duly made request for it under section 18;

(b) doesn't contain 'personal information' as precisely defined by section 1, and consequently isn't hit by section 34 providing for the 'Mandatory protection of privacy of third party who is natural person', and therefore can't lawfully and constitutionally be refused under that section;

(c) doesn't contain 'trade secrets of a third party' (per section 36(1)(a)) or 'financial, commercial, scientific or technical information ... the disclosure of which would be likely to cause harm to the commercial or financial interests of that third party' (per section 36(1)(b)) or 'information supplied in confidence by a third party the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected– (i) to put that third party at a disadvantage in contractual or other negotiations; or (ii) to prejudice that third party in commercial competition' (per section 36(1)(c));

(d) if released to a requester, entails no possibility that 'disclosure of the record would constitute an action for breach of a duty of confidence owed to a third party in terms of an agreement' (per section 37(1)(a)); or that such invoice 'consists of information that was supplied in confidence by a third party– (i) the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of similar information, or information from the same source; and (ii) if it is in the public interest that similar information, or information from the same source, should continue to be supplied' (per section 37(1)(b)); and,

(e) doesn't require the advocate's consent under any provision of PAIA or any other law¹⁸ for its release to a requester; and his refusal to consent to its release is legally irrelevant and founds no legal basis under PAIA for LASA to refuse access to it upon request duly made under section 18.

In sum, sections 34, 36 and 37 have no application to a request for access to LASA's advocates' statements of account showing what professional fees they charged it; and LASA's reliance on these sections to deny me sight of these duly requested public records will be manifestly incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

6. What a PAIA request 'relates to' in LASA's opinion (its own endlessly repeated phrase), i.e. a requester's stated or inferred purpose in making a request, is irrelevant under section 11(3) to the decision of whether or not

¹⁸ For instance, it's not legally privileged either – see *A Company and Others v Commissioner for SARS* (16360/2013) [2014] ZAWCHC 33; 2014 (4) SA 549 (WCC)(17 March 2014).

to grant it, as the Commission's former resident PAIA expert Dr Fola Adeleke tried teaching LASA deputy information officer Mtati by email on 22 August 2012 unsuccessfully:

We note ... that the requester's reason for requesting particular information is being deduced.^[19] It should be noted that PAIA is quite clear that requests made to public bodies do not have to be supported or justified by a reason for the request.^[20]

More particularly, the fact that records requested under section 18 of PAIA might in some way 'relate to' past, pending, or future intended litigation is no ground for refusing access to them, and may not lawfully be asserted as a basis for denying the request as 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' under section 45; and should LASA refuse my instant request on this basis it will be doing so grossly ignorantly, incompetently, illegally, unconstitutionally, and intentionally vexatiously.

7. A requester's stated reason for requesting access to public body records – such as for use in support of an intended criminal complaint to the National Director of Public Prosecutions – is irrelevant under section 11(3)(a)²¹ to the decision of the request; and should LASA cite this stated reason of mine for making my instant request as a basis for refusing it, by 'relat[ing]' it somehow to past civil litigation, thus diametrically contravening the said section, it will be doing so grossly ignorantly, incompetently, illegally, unconstitutionally, and intentionally vexatiously.

8. Unlike section 50(1)(a) regarding 'Right of access to records of private bodies' – 'A requester must be given access to a record of a private body if

¹⁹ In contravention of section 11(3)(b): 'A requester's right of access contemplated in subsection (1) is, subject to this Act, not affected by ... the information officer's belief as to what the requester's reasons are for requesting access.' Quoted in footnote 4 above, the Constitutional Court confirmed in *HSF* that a public record requester needs no reason for access to it.

²⁰ Section 11(1): 'A requester must be given access to a record of a public body if– (a) that requester complies with all the procedural requirements in this Act relating to a request for access to that record; and (b) access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in Chapter 4 of this Part.' C.f. section 50 governing entitlement to public body records, discussed in point 8 below.

²¹ 'A requester's right of access contemplated in subsection (1) is, subject to this Act, not affected by ... any reasons the requester gives for requesting access'.

... that record is required for the exercise or protection of any rights' – section 11 governing 'Right of access to records of public bodies' contains no such requirement, as the Labour Court emphasized in *National Teachers Union v Superintendent General: Department of Education & Culture, Kwazulu-Natal and Another* (D38/08) [2008] ZALC 18:

Unlike access to information from another person, access to information from the state is manifestly not constrained by the requirement that information should be for the exercise or protection of any rights.

Pathetically ignorant of the most basic distinction PAIA draws between *public* and *privately held records*, LASA's national office has over the past decade repeatedly asserted the test for entitlement to access *private body records* as a basis to justify denying me access to its *public records*:

In October 2010, my entire first PAIA request in August²² was 'declined as it is not relevant to you exercising any right you may have in law'. Again in April 2011, several records requested in March were refused because they were 'not relevant'. Again in November 2017, part of my request in October was refused because it 'has nothing to do with the prescripts of the objectives of PAIA, namely to enable the requester to fully exercise his rights and protect such rights'.

Should LASA assert for the fourth time that I'm not entitled to the records I've requested because I haven't claimed and showed that I need them to exercise or protect any of my rights, and because, in LASA's opinion, the records are 'not relevant' to exercising my rights, its refusal to comply with

²² Made inter alia, and most importantly, for the selection panel's report of its candidate recommendation for the Pietermaritzburg Senior Litigator post, the report was strangely furtively repeatedly refused on changing grounds: first ignored (a mute refusal under section 27); then expressly refused by allusion to sections 34 and 50; then refused again now specifically under section 44; then refused again now under sections 7 and 45 cited, with these justifications repeated in answering papers when I sued for the record. The complete recommendation report was finally released, years after the trial of my labour claim, following LASA's capitulation at court to my claim for the record, at the point of argument, to avoid an imminent order to compel delivery of the record, coupled with a declaration of constitutional delinquency under section 82(c), peremptory under section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.

my request on this basis will be grossly ignorant, incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

9. The fact that another public body has a copy of the records requested (in casu, LASA's section 32 reports, also in the Commission's possession) is no ground under PAIA to refuse the request.

In November 2017, part of my request in October (for a copy of a letter LASA wrote about me) was refused on the stupefyingly legally illiterate basis that I 'have every right in terms of the general principle of fairness to approach the [Magistrates] Commission who will deal with it [my request for access to the letter] in accordance with their own processes.'

Should LASA deny me access to its section 32 reports that I've duly requested and tell me to go off and 'approach' the Commission for them instead, 'in terms of the general principle of fairness', its refusal of my request on this basis will be grossly ignorant, incompetent, illegal, unconstitutional, and intentionally vexatious.

10. Finally, section 25 doesn't allow an information officer to deliberately keep a requester waiting for the 30 days maximum the section allows before notifying his or her decision to refuse his request as 'manifestly frivolous or vexatious' under section 45. If the request is clearly a waste of time in his or her alleged opinion therefore barred by section 45, section 25 requires that the requester be notified of the refusal 'as soon as reasonably possible', i.e. right away, so the requester can claim access to the illegally and unconstitutionally refused records in court, without unnecessary delay.

And if in the information officer's alleged opinion the request is an obvious waste of time and hit by section 45, then any ground advanced under section 26 for extending the maximum time allowed by section 25 for a response will be mala fide and insupportable, seeing as an extra month – two months in total – can't genuinely be necessary to respond to a request that's a pointless waste of time on its face and therefore disqualified by section 45.

LASA has consistently and repeatedly failed to respond expeditiously to my requests as section 25 has required of it; and it has consistently and repeatedly abused section 26 to cynically delay notifying me of its refusals on the disingenuous basis claimed after two months that they're plainly just a pointless waste of time and therefore disallowable under section 45, etc.

Should LASA once again slow-walk its response to delay notifying me of its reflexive knee-jerk refusal of my instant request as a waste of its time, this will be unlawful and intentionally vexatious.

Simply confirming to LASA, in the exercise of the Commission's section 83(3) powers, the correctness of these ten elementary points will likely prevent it again misapplying the provisions of the Act and violating my constitutional right of access to its public records – unless LASA means to show its contempt not just for the Constitution but also for the Chapter 9 institution empowered to see to the state's compliance with its information transparency provisions.

So I'm really not asking much of the Commission in requesting merely that it give its imprimatur to these ten basic educational modules in how not to respond PAIA requests illegally and unconstitutionally this time round.

In conclusion, how did we get to this? How's it possible that the 'the biggest law firm on the African continent', as its website bills it, 'the largest legal institution in Africa', headed by a judge president as a putative guarantee of constitutional, legal and ethical probity in the conduct of its operations, should so determinedly, persistently, dishonestly and obtusely violate, with complete impunity over the past decade, the public information transparency provisions of our democratic Constitution, despite all the checks crafted by Parliament and put in place to prevent this, namely the reporting provisions of sections 32 and 84 of PAIA; the monitoring, assisting, training and remedial teaching provisions of section 83(3) of the Act; and the parliamentary oversight provisions of section 55(2)(b)(ii) of the Constitution?

The crisis can be traced to a number of causes:

First, the Commission's email records reveal that LASA's repeated and persistent illegal and unconstitutional refusals to comply with my first three PAIA requests in 2010 and 2011 about which I'd repeatedly complained to it – referred to by the Commission as 'the Brink matter' and 'the Brink saga ... reported to ... Parliament' – showed a 'worryingly high ... incidence of confusion' at LASA about what its information transparency obligations are, to the extent that the Commission found its national officers were 'not aware of the PAIA legislation at all', leading it to 'urgently' conduct a 'training intervention' to provide them with 'a working knowledge of PAIA' found totally lacking among them.

In its report of the PAIA training symposium it held for LASA in October 2011, the Commission reiterated its earlier observations that 'Most participants had no prior knowledge of PAIA' and were 'overwhelmed by the requirements of the legislation' causing 'inconsistent application in the organisation'.

Indeed, LASA's head office lawyers frankly confessed their total 'lack of application based knowledge' and their consequent 'challenges complying with PAIA'. They 'identified [the] misinterpretation and misapplication [of PAIA] as of high risk to LASA' and 'reacted to the reporting of LASA as non-compliant to Parliament with concern.'

Most significantly, they conceded that 'they had previously been misapplying the provisions of PAIA in certain instances' – i.e. to my PAIA requests of 2010–11, the only 'instances' in which any PAIA requests were refused in those years, and the very reason the training workshop was held (per the Commission's email records) 'as soon as possible' (i) to remedy the emergency arising from this major public body's continuing violation of the Constitution in ignorantly, illegally, and unconstitutionally refusing my PAIA requests, and (ii) to ensure that 'misapplication [of the Act by LASA] does not recur'.

Having 'undertaken to review decisions which may not have had justification in terms of PAIA', i.e. the illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my first three PAIA requests, in regard to which it had 'previously been misapplying the provisions of PAIA', LASA promptly reneged on its undertaking to the

Commission and continued withholding records I'd requested, which, by its own admission to the Commission, it had illegally denied me. And which suppressed records I then had to crow-bar out of LASA by dint of round after round of pre-trial discovery procedure in the Labour Court: no less than three pre-trial conferences, two under judicial supervision at court, and an application to compel discovery of the records that LASA didn't want me and the judge to see.

As LASA's subsequent repeated 'misinterpretation and misapplication' of the Act and its obviously illegal and unconstitutional total refusals of my further PAIA requests showed, the Commission's special remedial lesson for LASA's national office in how to apply the Act was a total failure.

Second, having particular regard to the 'primacy of the legislation' in our open democracy (I'm quoting the report); 'the status of PAIA as a fundamental right [enforcement law]'; 'public bodies as repositories of information' and 'transparency and public participation' as 'fundamental cornerstone[s] of sound democracies', all of which was 'reiterated and emphasized at different points of the training', LASA acknowledged that 'a review of the organisational response to PAIA was necessary to improve compliance and efficacy' and it undertook to the Commission 'to create a structure ... to further enhance the process of implementation and compliance ... critical ... for fulfilment of the PAIA mandate.' To ensure 'the provision of increased accessibility of information', LASA 'identified the need to have a clear budget dedicated to PAIA compliance and implementation', for the reason that 'PAIA application was time consuming and compliance required dedicated personnel'.

LASA reneged on this further undertaking to the Commission as well, and failed to attend to any of this, with the result that 'misapplication' of the Act in consistently and repeatedly illegally and unconstitutionally blocking my access to duly requested 'information' has continued to 'recur', year after year to date.

Third, according to the Commission's attendance register, none of LASA's information- and deputy information officers bothered to attend the 'urgently' conducted 'training intervention', and consequently none of them possess any 'working knowledge of PAIA' as is evident from the ongoing illegal and

unconstitutional blanket refusals of my PAIA requests on obviously spurious grounds year after year since 2010, as a result of LASA's continuing 'misinterpretation and misapplication' of the Act.

This is despite the fact that 'the SAHRC was of the view' expressed to the Justice Portfolio Committee in December 2012 (per the Parliamentary Monitoring Group's minute) 'that PAIA was very technical and it was necessary that judicial officers had the skills to apply it' – achieved in the case of 'magistrates' by 'training'. Since the Act is 'very technical' it naturally behoved LASA's information- and deputy information officers to undergo the 'training' the Commission offered 'to ensure that', like magistrates, they 'had the skills to apply it' too. But as said, none of them presented themselves for such 'training' when the Commission gave LASA's head office special corrective instruction regarding PAIA under section 83(3)(c) and (d) on how to apply the Act, after the repeated illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my first three PAIA requests in 2010 and 2011, which had moved the Commission to 'urgently' intervene in LASA's repeated ongoing violation of the Constitution.

The result of their truancy from the special remedial class on PAIA is that the 'very technical' field of constitutional information law in our country remains entirely beyond LASA's information- and deputy information officers' mental grasp – likewise such basic constitutional norms in the post-apartheid era, to which they remain complete strangers, as 'transparency and public participation' as 'fundamental cornerstone[s] of sound democracies'; and LASA has continued to grossly misapply the provisions of the Act to meretriciously falsely justify refusing my requests and prevent me accessing its public records in the exercise of my constitutional right to do so, with the object of obstructing my corruption investigation by all means possible.

Fourth, instead of deciding and responding to PAIA requests herself, or duly instructing one of her deputy information officers to do so subject to her supervision under section 17(2), information officer Vedalankar has abdicated her statutory and constitutional obligations imposed by PAIA²³ by passing my PAIA requests on for decision by Corporate Legal Manager Solly Sekgota,

²³ Section 1 designates the CEO of public bodies like LASA 'information officer' ex officio.

described in LASA's section 32 report for 2016/17 as its 'PAIA functionary' – an office unique to LASA; not contemplated by PAIA; and ipso facto illegal – with his refusals of my requests nominally signed by his superiors to fake a patina of legality, invariably deputy information officer Mtati and most recently Hundermark. Sekgota confirmed as much in an email to a third party on 28 November 2017 concerning my PAIA request of 30 October 2017: 'I have to reply tomorrow.' As usual, Mtati signed his 'reply' refusing my request as usual.

Since the Act doesn't permit anyone besides an information officer or a duly delegated deputy information officer to decide PAIA requests, and Sekgota holds no such delegation, he's been refusing my requests ultra vires and illegally, the merits of his justifications quite aside.

Not only is Sekgota legally unqualified and incompetent to handle my PAIA requests, he's also legally clueless. Sekgota was one of LASA's head office lawyers present at the Commission's PAIA training workshop who repeatedly confessed that as far as the practice of constitutional information law goes he doesn't have the faintest idea of what he's doing. (I quote LASA's head office lawyers above frankly admitting this.) And as is evident from his incompetent reliance on wholly irrelevant and inapplicable sections 7, 34, 36, 37 and 45 of PAIA to illegally and unconstitutionally refuse my PAIA requests year after year, Sekgota remains incorrigibly ignorant of the Act and how to apply it to respect and give effect to my fundamental civil right to public information enshrined in section 32(1)(a) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The Commission's training seminar evidently went in one ear and out the other, completely over his head, none of it comprehended. In other words, LASA's Corporate Legal Manager and PAIA functionary Sekgota has demonstrated irremediable learning difficulties, which is to say PAIA requests at LASA are being decided by a legal imbecile.

Another of LASA's special-needs lawyers identified in the attendance register as requiring extra lessons in how to respond to PAIA requests properly was Mtati, the nominal author of most refusals of my requests since 2013; but as the unsigned open entry in the register shows, he bunked the class and therefore

wasn't taught and didn't learn from the Commission how to respond to PAIA requests legally and constitutionally.

Mtati's repeated signature of Sekgota's illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my requests year after year shows that LASA's second most senior attorney remains wholly ignorant of PAIA and equally lacks 'the skills to apply' it.

Fifth, this shambles is compounded by the fact that LASA's de facto supreme authority in PAIA matters, Chief Legal Executive Patrick Hundermark, is even less legally educated than LASA's abysmally ignorant and incompetent 'PAIA functionary' Solly Sekgota.

Both the Commission's email records and Hundermark's correspondence with me reflect that he's been directly involved in the illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my PAIA requests and suppression of duly requested records right from the start. They record his false assurance given the Commission that my initial PAIA request of August 2010, which had been ignored, would be duly responded to in October 2010; instead it was expressly refused in toto that month on utterly spurious grounds, abandoned and replaced with other equally spurious ones in January 2011, themselves later abandoned under relentless pressure in the Labour Court to discover documents that had been duly requested under PAIA but illegally and unconstitutionally refused, but finally yielded in the litigation after protracted resistance.

The Commission's email records further reflect that Hundermark was well aware of the Commission's alarm over Vedalankar's illegal and unconstitutional total refusal in October 2010 of my initial August request, and refusal again on new different equally irrelevant and inapplicable grounds in January 2011, as well as her similarly illegal refusal of my December 2010 request and Nair's illegal refusal in April 2011 of key records listed in my March request. The Commission's email to LASA's Legal Training Practitioner Raju of 12 July 2011 records that 'the reporting of the Brink saga (you may be familiar with it – Patrick [Hundermark] is) to Parliament and the Commission has brought LASA's organizational [non]compliance with the legislation into sharp relief.'

Despite this '[non]compliance' with my early PAIA requests, i.e. 'the Brink saga ... report[ed] to Parliament' that spurred the Commission to 'urgently' teach LASA how PAIA works, and with which '[non]compliance with the legislation' Hundermark was 'familiar' – indeed LASA's internal email records show he was centrally involved in arranging the PAIA training workshop – he has personally persisted in illegally and unconstitutionally obstructing my PAIA requests to date: by himself unlawfully raising a spurious financial charge against me in February 2015 for alleged background reading of my November 2014 request, not permitted by the Act and ultimately abandoned at court, along with the section 7 and 45 justifications advanced for refusing to respond to the request; and by himself refusing in March 2018 – on the usual basis: sections 7 and 45 – my request for certain financial records that I'd addressed to the Justice Department, which the latter had transferred to LASA.

Although he's not a deputy information officer at LASA, not holding a written delegation as such by information officer Vedalankar under section 17,²⁴ and he therefore has no legal authority to deal with PAIA requests, LASA's section 32 report for 2013/14 shows that Hundermark has been illegally conducting himself as a 'relevant authority' (per section 1) in incompetently deciding and dismissing appeals by requesters against the refusal of their record request.

Had Hundermark deigned to present himself for training by the Commission in how PAIA works – the attendance register shows he didn't – he'd have been taught the basic point, among all the others he missed, that section 1 of PAIA defines LASA as a 'public body' of the category-(b) type (per the report mentioning this), and that accordingly it has no internal appeal process and no 'relevant authority' to decide appeals.

²⁴ LASA's PAIA manual incorrectly identifies the 'Chief Legal Executive' as a deputy information officer. Corrected in my heads of argument in my second PAIA application to the High Court, I mistakenly allowed in my replying affidavit that Hundermark's designation by the PAIA manual as a deputy information officer, on which nomination he stood and crowed in his answering affidavit, qualified him as such. As I pointed out in my heads (online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5) with reference to the provisions of section 17, Hundermark is not in fact a duly delegated deputy information officer, not holding a written delegation by Vedalankar, and his refusal of my request for financial records (sought from the Justice Department) was ultra vires and illegal on its own terms.

In sum, the ultimate problem with LASA's ongoing wilful non-compliance with PAIA – to illegally and unconstitutionally suppress duly requested records, with the aim of obstructing the exposure and reporting of a disintegrating cover-up of the most serious malfeasance, including criminal misconduct – is that its information- and deputy information officers and head office lawyers, including Legal Executive Mtati and Corporate Legal Manager Solly Sekgota, both in Hundermark's unfortunately named Legal Development Department, are taking their cues in PAIA matters from a complete legal ignoramus in constitutional information law, who's proved incapable of 'legal development' himself.

Thanks to top LASA attorney Hundermark's pitiful ignorance of the Act, its 'misinterpretation and misapplication' continues to pose a 'high risk to LASA'.²⁵

Sixth, by repeated false annual reporting under section 32, LASA has concealed from the Commission its flagrant ongoing defiance of the information transparency provisions of the Constitution and its non-compliance with PAIA giving effect to them. And thus misinformed and deceived by LASA year after year, and relying on the false information provided it, the Commission has repeatedly falsely reported LASA to the NA in its annual section 84 reports as PAIA compliant in its responses to my record requests over the years, when in truth and in fact virtually all of them have been illegally and unconstitutionally refused.

Seventh, the gatekeepers of the information I've been requesting since 2010 are the very same national management executives directly implicated in the malfeasance I'm investigating with my PAIA requests, which, after repeated litigation to compel compliance with them, have already turned up dismissible and criminal misconduct. (It's been like asking a man to hand over the rope for his own hanging – explaining LASA's extreme resistance to complying with my record requests under one changing false excuse after another, speciously claimed to be rooted in the Act.)

²⁵ See the several heavy orders claimed in my three notices of motion in the High Court, online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.

Looking to LASA's Board to exercise its oversight responsibility over executive management to ensure its compliance with the Constitution and the law in the conduct of LASA's operations has proved to be an absolute waste of time. How Mlambo JP twice responded disgracefully to my repeated appeals to him and the Board in the past concerning the repeated clearly illegal and unconstitutional refusals of my early PAIA requests (also to ministerial and parliamentary enquiries into it), in breach of his oath to defend and uphold the Constitution, is the precisely the subject of several of my pending complaints against him to the Judicial Service Commission.²⁶

Eighth, staff turnover at the Commission over the past decade has resulted in loss of institutional memory, with the result that my repeated appeals for its support over the years have aroused no sense of accelerating crisis and the dire need for further intervention in LASA's continuing violation of section 32(1)(a) of the Constitution.

In the event that I have to apply to the High Court yet again, for the fourth time – my tenth application, counting those made to the Magistrate's Court – to vindicate my violated fundamental right to access the public records specified in my instant request, or to obtain sworn certification in some cases that they don't exist, I'll put this letter up with my founding affidavit, together with your response to it, to demonstrate that before approaching the court again under section 78 for relief under section 82 I tried obviating this easily avoided, unnecessary further litigation (per the SCA in *Claase*)²⁷ by seeking the Commission's support, specifically contemplated by the Act, with a request that it exercise its special statutory powers to assist requesters like me under section 83(3)(c), and to teach LASA's information- and deputy information officers under section 83(3)(e) how to apply the Act properly, including correcting under section 83(3)(d) their persistent misapplication of the Act in responding to my PAIA requests by yet again raising obviously wholly irrelevant and inapplicable

²⁶ Accessible online at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.

²⁷ The case 'illustrates how a disregard of the aims of the Act and the absence of common sense and reasonableness has resulted in this court having to deal with a matter which should never have required litigation.'

sections of PAIA against me to falsely justify suppressing duly requested information to obstruct my corruption investigation and evade accountability for the multiple malfeasances, including criminal misconduct, which I've already established, and in regard to which I'm gathering further evidence.

And should LASA disregard the Commission's corrective advice given as our country's officially appointed PAIA experts, monitors, assistants, and teachers under section 83(3), and persist in refusing my instant request on the same spurious grounds it's been raising against me since 2013 to justify violating my constitutionally guaranteed right to public information, and I'm forced to sue yet again, then obviously there'll be hell to pay by the delinquent officers responsible, by way of personal costs orders made against them, *à la* the well known *Black Sash* and *SASSA* decisions of the Constitutional Court.

Please monitor the matter under section 83(3)(b) pending LASA's decision of my instant request. I'll let you know what it is as soon as I receive it.

Yours sincerely

ADV ANTHONY BRINK
anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com
083 779 4174

For convenient copying and/or further distribution, electronic copies of this letter and the PAIA request annexed to it are available both in PDF and MS Word at goo.gl/Ut9eH5.



Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

D

Brink's PAIA request of 12 April 2019

1 message

Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
To: patrickh <patrickh@legal-aid.co.za>

9 May 2019 at 14:59

Chief Legal Executive Patrick Hundermark, Legal Aid SA

Dear Mr Hundermark

Before automatically rejecting my currently pending PAIA request duly emailed to information officer Vedalankar on 12 April, as you promised to when ignorantly, incompetently, illegally and unconstitutionally rejecting my previous one, now before the Pietermaritzburg High Court, you'd be well advised to study my letter about it to the director of the SAHRC's PAIA Unit, copied widely to local and international interested parties, including to new LASA chairperson Judge Motsamai Makume.

The letter and PAIA request are accessible in a Dropbox folder linked here: <https://goo.gl/Ut9eH5>.

Tread carefully.

Anthony Brink



Ref: GP/1516/0395
13 May 2019

Vidhu Vedalankar

Chief Executive Officer and Information Officer, Legal Aid South Africa

Per email: ceo@legal-aid.co.za

Patrick Hundermark

Chief Legal Executive and Deputy Information Officer, Legal Aid South Africa

Per email: PatrickH@legal-aid.co.za

RE: PAIA MANUAL AND INFORMATION REQUEST FROM ANTHONY BRINK

Dear Ms Vedalankar and Mr Hundermark

The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC or Commission) has assisted Adv Anthony Brink in terms of the discretionary powers vested in the Commission by section 83(3) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2 of 2000 (PAIA) at various times since 2010. The Commission is in receipt of a letter from Adv Brink, dated 12 April 2019, as well as an information request submitted by Adv Brink to LASA, also dated 12 April 2019. In terms of section 83(3)(c), the Commission is accordingly again rendering its assistance to Adv Brink to the extent 'reasonably possible' by making the following advisory recommendations to LASA as permitted by section 83(3)(d) of the PAIA.

LASA PAIA Manual

It has come to the Commission's attention that certain errors appear in LASA's PAIA Manual dated 26 May 2018:

(i) Under para 19, entitled 'Remedies available to the Requester in terms of the Act', erroneous references to a 30 day time period within which to lodge an application with a court must be replaced with the correct period of **180 days**. This change must be effected in paras 19.1; 19.2; 19.3 and 19.4. See further *Brümmer v Minister for Social Development and Others* 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC).

(ii) Under para 22.3, entitled 'Legal Records', requesters are advised to 'set out very clearly the reasons that such access is required so as to enable Legal Aid SA to evaluate such requests'. This statement should be



deleted since it is contrary to section 11(3)(a) and (b) of the PAIA, which stipulates that a requester's right of access is not affected by the reasons for the request or the information officer's belief as to the requester's reasons for requesting access. If legally privileged records are requested from LASA, LASA must refuse any such request as mandated by section 40 of the PAIA, unless the person entitled to privilege has waived such privilege.

Information request dated 12 April 2019

Having perused the information request dated 12 April 2019, the Commission makes the following advisory recommendations:

(i) Reasons for request irrelevant and disclosure the rule

The Commission emphasises the prescripts of section 11(3) of the PAIA, in that a requester's reasons for an information request submitted to a public body are irrelevant. As the Constitutional Court stated in *President of the Republic of South Africa v M & G Media Ltd* (2012 (2) SA 50 (CC)), 'the disclosure of information is the rule and exemption from disclosure is the exception'. The information request dated 12 April 2019 therefore bears to be considered on its own merits, and disclosure should only be denied where a valid ground for refusal (section 34-45 of the PAIA) exists. Any grounds for refusal must be interpreted narrowly, as held by the Constitutional Court.

(ii) Period in which to respond

Following telephonic conversations with two LASA representatives on Friday 10 May 2019, the Commission confirms that the 30 day response period only starts running from the date that the information request was actually received by LASA (section 25(1) of the PAIA).

(iii) Part One of the information request

The Commission is of the view that the information requested in para 1 may constitute records contemplated in section 36 or section 37 of the PAIA. This places a mandatory obligation on LASA's information officer to 'take all reasonable steps to inform a third party to whom or which the record related of the request' (section 47(1) of the PAIA). The Commission therefore urges LASA to initiate a third party notification procedure within 21 days of receipt of the request, and to provide all information set out in section 47(3) to relevant third parties. In terms of section 48



of the PAIA, relevant third parties enjoy 21 days within which to make oral or written representations, or to provide written consent for the disclosure of the records.

The Commission furthermore advises that the records requested in para 2 be disclosed, unless LASA has identified a ground for refusal which would render disclosure harmful.

(iv) Part Two of the information request

The Commission is of the view that the records requested in para 3 should be disclosed. The Commission is in possession of LASA's section 32 reports for the 2016/17 and 2017/18 financial years, and will disclose these to the requester since such information is publicly available.

(v) Part Three of the information request

The Commission is unable to determine whether the information requested under Part Three has already been requested and/or disclosed under the Settlement Agreement dated 11 February 2016, or in any of the three subsequent information requests currently pending before the High Court. In determining whether the same records have been requested and/or disclosed in the past, LASA may have recourse to the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment in *BHP Billiton PLC Inc v De Lange* (2013 (3) SA 571 (SCA)). To the extent that the Settlement Agreement governs any of the requested records, the terms of the Settlement Agreement should be adhered to.

The Commission trusts that the above is of assistance and avails itself to engage with LASA should LASA have any queries regarding the application of the PAIA.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Shanelle van der Berg".

Dr Shanelle van der Berg

Deputy Information Officer
South African Human Rights Commission



Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

F

LASA matter

Shanelle Van Der Berg <svanderberg@sahrc.org.za>

13 May 2019 at 15:46

To: "anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com" <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

Cc: Tshepang Sebulela <tsebulela@sahrc.org.za>, Judy Hollenbach <jhollenbach@sahrc.org.za>, Mokgadi Nyuswa <mnyuswa@sahrc.org.za>

Dear Adv Brink



The South African Human Rights Commission received your letter dated 12 April, as well your information request to LASA also dated 12 April, on 6 May 2019.

Please be advised that the Commission disbanded its PAIA Unit in 2016, in anticipation of the handover of its PAIA functions to the Information Regulator. The Commission accordingly now has a single PAIA Compliance Officer in its employ.

The Commission is thus unable to peruse the voluminous papers in this matter. However, the Commission has issued the attached correspondence (containing advisory recommendations) to LASA. Please further find attached LASA's section 32 reports for the 2016/17 and 2017/18 financial years. Section 32 reports for the 2018/19 year are not yet due.

We trust the above is of assistance.

Best regards

<p>Dr. Shanelle van der Berg Deputy Information Officer</p> <p>Senior Researcher: Equality</p> <p>T: +27 11 877 3608 (Ms Mokgadi Nyuswa, Administrative Assistant)</p> <p>E: svanderberg@sahrc.org.za</p> <p>Forum III – Braampark Offices, 33 Hoofd Street, Braamfontein, 2017 Switchboard T: +27 11 877 3600</p>	<p>Upcoming events</p> <p>Click here for upcoming events</p>  <p>Think before printing</p> <p>Follow us:</p> <p>@SAHRCommission</p> <p>SAhumanrightscommission</p> <p>YouTube: SAHRC1</p>	 <p>www.sahrc.org.za Info@sahrc.org.za</p>
<p><i>Transforming society. Securing rights. Restoring dignity</i></p>		

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
Recommendation letter to LASA_13 May 2019.pdf
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Legal Aid G
South Africa

Your voice. For justice.

Independent and within reach.

Mr. Anthony Brink
36 Pearson Street
Eshowe,
Kwazulu Natal
3815
Tel: 083 779 4174
Email: anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com

29 De Beer Street
Braamfontein, 2017
Private Bag X76
Braamfontein 2017
Tel: 011 877 2000
Fax: 011 877 2222
www.legal-aid.co.za

Dear Mr. Brink,

REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO RECORDS OF LEGAL AID SA: AR BRINK

1. I refer to the above matter and to your request of access to records of Legal Aid SA dated **12 April 2019** addressed to the Information Officer, Ms Vedalankar and further record that such request was received on **25 April 2019** after we had requested same.
2. The request has been referred to me as the Deputy Information Officer for reply.
3. Before I reply to your requests for records, I wish to place on record that Legal Aid SA will not comment on the allegations and conclusions that you have made relating to your requests, except to state that such assertions and conclusions are baseless and defamatory, and that the veracity of same are denied. Legal Aid SA and its officials reserves their rights in law and will, if they elect to do so, respond at the appropriate forum and time.
4. I hereby reply to your requests in the table below-

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Number	Record requested	Reply
PART ONE		
1.	All Legal Aid SA's counsels' fees for their services in drawing or settling the said postponement application papers, and for arguing the application.	The record is refused. The request is manifestly frivolous and vexatious. Secondly, the information falls within the prescripts of personal information of third parties and they refused to grant permission to release such information as required in terms of section 47 of PAIA.
2.	All travel expense and subsistence vouchers reflecting what Legal Aid SA's junior advocate and two in house attorneys to attend the said postponement application.	The record relating to junior counsels records refused on the basis that she has refused to grant permission to release such information as required in terms of section 47 of PAIA. The records relating two in house attorneys is refused on the basis that it is manifestly frivolous and vexatious and further seeks to substantially and unreasonable divert the resources of Legal Aid SA and furthermore such request does not align to the prescripts and objectives of PAIA, namely to enable the requester to fully exercise his rights and protect such rights.

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PART TWO

3.	Legal Aid SA's annual reports made under section 32 of PAIA to the South African Human Rights Commission for:	
3.1	2016/17	Access to the record is granted. The copy of the record is attached as Annexure PH1 . This record was submitted to SAHRC and can be accessible from SAHRC.
3.2	2017/18	Access to the record is granted. The record is attached as Annexure PH2 . This record was submitted to SAHRC and can be accessible from SAHRC.
3.3	2018/19	Access to the record is granted. The record is attached as Annexure PH3 . This record was submitted to SAHRC and can be accessible from SAHRC

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PART THREE

4	Any record identifying what vacant 'positions could not be filled' at Legal Aid SA that 'they' [Vedalankar and other Legal Aid Sa officers] knew about.	The record is refused. The record requested is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Appeal Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the limited resources of Legal Aid SA.
5	Any record reflecting the reason these vacant 'positions could not be filled' that 'they knew'.	The record is refused. The record requested is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Appeal Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the limited resources of Legal Aid SA.
6	The record of executive management's decision to 'adjust the budget' because 'they knew that those positions could not be filled'.	The record is refused. The record requested is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Appeal Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious

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		and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of Legal Aid SA.
7	The boards resolution to approve the 'adjustment of] the budget because the vacant 'positions could not be filled', if, per Legal Aid SA's Approval Framework, this entailed a 'Reallocation of budget in excess of 8% between cost centres'.	The record is refused. The record requested is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Appeal Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the limited resources of Legal Aid SA.
8	'[T]he information' about Legal Aid SA's adjustment of] that Vedalankar sent the Committee after the meeting, as undertaken to Hon Jeffrey; And its covering letter.	The record is refused. The record requested is similar, ancillary or connected to the legal proceedings at the Durban Labour Court under case 529/11 which matter was ventilated and finalised by a decision of the Labour Appeal Court. The request is therefore manifestly frivolous and vexatious and seeks to substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of Legal Aid SA.

Your voice. For justice.





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South Africa

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Yours Faithfully,

Mr. Patrick Hundermark

Deputy Information Officer.

Your voice. For justice.

Document Properties



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Description

File: 1.2.Original response by LASA to PAIA request of 12 April 2019.pdf

Title: CS_C284e-20190516123126

Author:

Subject:

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Created: 5/16/2019 12:31:26 PM

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Location: C:\Users\Anthony\Documents\1.LABOUR COURT\3.PAIA after judgment\46.VV6 Hundermar...\1.Response etc LASA PAIA 2019\

File Size: 881.43 KB (902,586 Bytes)

Page Size: 8.26 x 11.68 in Number of Pages: 27

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Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

Clarification for the payment notification received

7 messages

Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>
To: Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

24 April 2019 at 11:25

Good Day Mr. Brink

We have received the notification of these payment.

Please clarify the payment.

Regards

Mr Solly Sekgota
Corporate Legal Manager
Legal Development
Legal Aid South Africa

This email is considered a business record and is therefore property of Legal Aid South Africa. This email, and any files transmitted with it are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. This communication represents the originator's personal views and opinions, which do not necessarily reflect those of Legal Aid South Africa. If you are not the original recipient or the person responsible for delivering the email to the intended recipient, be advised that you have this email in error, and that any use, dissemination, forwarding, printing, or copying of this email is strictly prohibited. If you received this email in error, please immediately notify postmaster@legal-aid.co.za
Thank You.

 **Payment Notification.pdf**
63K

anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
To: Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>

25 April 2019 at 11:26

Dear Mr Sekgota

My EFT payment to which you refer was to cover the R35 request fee prescribed by section 22 of PAIA for a Form A request for access to certain records, which, on the same day, I delivered to information officer Vedalankar as prescribed by section 18, by email as that section allows

Along with a copy of a letter to the director of the SAHRC's PAIA Unit, copied very widely.

Including a couple of days later to new LASA chairperson Judge Makume.

(I chanced to learn of his appointment the day after I sent the letter.)

Yours sincerely

Anthony Brink

Sent from my Windows 10 device

From: Solly Sekgota
Sent: Wednesday, 24 April 2019 11:25 AM
To: Anthony Brink
Subject: Clarification for the payment notification received
Importance: High

Good Day Mr. Brink

We have received the notification of these payment.

Please clarify the payment.

Regards

Mr Solly Sekgota
Corporate Legal Manager
Legal Development
Legal Aid South Africa

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Thank You.

Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>
To: "anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com" <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

25 April 2019 at 14:16

Thanks Mr Brink

I will investigate and revert to you

[Quoted text hidden]

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Thank You.

Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>
To: "anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com" <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

25 April 2019 at 16:45

Good day Mr. Brink

Please note that after my investigation, we are unable to locate the request.

Please be kind to re-sent to me

Regards

Mr Solly Sekgota
Corporate Legal Manager
Legal Development
Legal Aid South Africa

From: Solly Sekgota
Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2019 2:17 PM
To: 'anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com' <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Clarification for the payment notification received

Thanks Mr Brink

I will investigate and revert to you

Regards

Mr Solly Sekgota
Corporate Legal Manager
Legal Development

From: anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2019 11:26 AM
To: Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>

[Quoted text hidden]

[Quoted text hidden]

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Thank You.

anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
To: Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>

25 April 2019 at 17:50

Will do.

[Quoted text hidden]

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Thank You.

[Quoted text hidden]

Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>
To: "anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com" <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>

25 April 2019 at 17:51

Thanks

[Quoted text hidden]

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Thank You.

Anthony Brink <anthonybrink.sa@gmail.com>
To: Solly Sekgota <SollyS@legal-aid.co.za>

25 April 2019 at 18:08

Dear Mr Sekgota
Here's everything in a Dropbox folder: <http://bit.ly/2UE9iHe>
Will that do?
Cheers
AB

[Quoted text hidden]